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1.  Civil War and the Study of Economics
Internal civil conflict has been common-place  during  the  past  half-century,  a 
fact that, until recently, escaped the notice 
of  most  economists.  Civil  wars,  or  those 
 internal  conflicts  that  count  more  than 
1,000  battle  deaths  in  a  single  year,  have 
afflicted  a  third  of  all  nations.  Counting 
civil conflicts, or those that count at  least 
 twenty-five  battle  deaths  per  annum, 
increases  the  incidence  to  more  than 
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percent  of  nations  have  experienced  at  least 
ten years of civil war during the period.
The  proportion  of  countries  embroiled 
in  civil  conflict  at  a  single  point  in  time 
increased steadily through the last half of the 














between  low per  capita  incomes and higher 
propensities  for  internal  war  is  one  of  the 
most robust empirical relationships in the lit-
erature. Figure 3  illustrates  the  relationship 
between per capita income (percentiles) and 
civil war using a nonparametric Fan regres-
sion;  countries  towards  the  bottom  of  the 
world income distribution—many in Africa—
have  several  times more wars  than  those  in 
1   These definitions come from the well-known UCDP/
PRIO  dataset  developed  by  Nils  Petter  Gleditsch  et 
al.  (2002)  and  extended  in  Lotta  Harbom  and  Peter 
Wallensteen  (2007).  UCDP/PRIO  defines  conflict  as  “a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/
or  territory  where  the  use  of  armed  force  between  two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results  in  at  least  25  battle-related  deaths.”  As  noted 
below, the definition and coding of civil war is contested, 
but our main points are robust to alternative approaches.
2    The  proportion  of  individuals  directly  affected  by 
war  violence  is  lower  than  suggested  by  this  figure,  as 








One reason  is  that  this  line can be drawn in 
reverse.  Conflicts  devastate  life,  health,  and 




and disease  (Benjamin Coghlan et  al.  2007). 
Although the accuracy of mortality figures in 
such war zones is open to question, estimated 
mortality  figures  for  Rwanda,  Angola,  and 
Sudan are likewise shocking. Massive loss of life 
inevitably  affects  the  economy.  Warfare  also 
destroys  physical  infrastructure  and  human 
capital, as well as possibly altering some social 
and  political  institutions.  Moreover,  internal 
wars  are  contagious;  refugee  flows,  disease, 




consequences  of  internal  warfare  may  be  so 
great as to be a factor in the growing income 
gap  between  the  world’s  richest  and  poorest 
nations (Paul Collier et al. 2003).
A  seeming  paradox,  however,  is  that 
warfare  is  also  sometimes  credited  for  the 
 technological  and  institutional   development 
that underpins Western economic  prosperity. 
Both  internal  and  external  wars  are  com-
monplace  in  European   history.  Several 
scholars  have  claimed  that  inter-state  wars 
and  wars  of  territorial  conquest  served  a 
critical  role  in enabling  the development of 
strong  and  capable  government  institutions 
in Europe (e.g., Daron Acemoglu and James 
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3    The  survey  included  thirty-eight undergraduate  and 
twenty-five graduate syllabi. We searched for online syllabi 
for undergraduate institutions ranked in the top fifty of the 
U.S. News and World Report college rankings (2007a), and 
for Ph.D. economics programs  ranked  in  the  top  twenty-
five of either the National Research Council (1995), Piper 










in  their  subject  index.  Moreover,  a  2007 
survey  (by  the  authors)  of  sixty-three  devel-
opment  economics  course  syllabi  in  leading 
U.S. universities reveals that only 13 percent 
of  undergraduate  courses  and  24  percent  of 
graduate courses mention any of these topics 
at all.3 Over the past decade, however, many 
economists  and  other  social  scientists  have 
worked  to better understand  the causes  and 
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and  duration,  postwar  reconstruction,  and 
the  emergence  of  peaceable  institutions,  in 
part  because  these  subliteratures  are  still 
largely in flux. We must also neglect related 
forms  of  violence—interstate  war,  terror-
ism,  coups,  communal  violence,  political 
repression,  and  crime—to  keep  this  article 
a  reasonable  length.  This  is  a  pity  because 
the distinction between civil wars and other 
forms  of  political  instability  has  largely 
been  assumed  rather  than  demonstrated.4
Our  principal  conclusions  challenge 
researchers  to  focus  on  new  questions, 
econometric  methods,  and  data.  First, 
beginning  with  the  origins  of  conflict,  we 
























– – – – –
Proportion of countries with civil war





4    Related  literatures  investigate  the  logic  and 
organization  of  terrorism,  including:  self-selection 
and  screening  of  terrorist  recruits  (Ethan  Bueno  de 
Mesquita  2005);  why  radical  religious  clubs  special-
ize in suicide attacks (Eli Berman and David D. Laitin 
2008);  how  terrorist  organizations  use  bureaucracy  to 
align  the  asymmetric  preferences  for  violence  among 
leaders  and  operatives  (Jacob  N.  Shapiro  2008);  the 
economic  logic  of   hostage-taking  and  government 
response  (Todd  Sandler  and  Walter  Enders  2004);  the 
splintering  and  ideology  of  terrorist  groups  (Bueno  de 
Mesquita  2008);  the  logic  of  suicide  missions  (Diego 
Gambetta  2005);  and  why  terrorists  employ  roadside 
bombs  (Matthew  A.  Hanson  2007).  The  line  between 
rebel  and  terrorist  groups  is  blurry,  and  many  of  the 
lessons we draw may apply  to  terrorism. Further  theo-
retical work  laying out  the analytical distinctiveness of 
civil  wars  versus  terrorism  and  other  forms  of  politi-
cal  violence  would  be  useful.  Anjali  Thomas  Bohlken 
and  Ernest  Sergenti  (2008)  document  the  close  link 
between  local  economic  conditions  and  the  outbreak 
of communal (inter-religious) riots across Indian states.
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Central  theoretical  problems  remain 
 unresolved,  including  the  sources  of  armed 
group  cohesion  amid  pervasive  collective 
action  problems.  Moreover,  we  have  yet 
to  develop  persuasive  arguments  for  non-
traditional  mechanisms—myopic  or  selfish 
leaders, for example, or the role of  ideology 
and  identity  in  reducing  free-riding  within 
armed  groups.  As  a  consequence,  too  little 
empirical work is motivated by (and explicitly 
derived from) formal models.
Second,  the  leading  existing  theories 
remain  untested.  Simple  contest  mod-
els—ones  that  link  conflict  to  geographic 
 conditions  that  favor  insurgency,  or  ones 
where  poverty  triggers  political  violence—
have been tested often. Yet one of the most 
dominant rational explanations for civil war, 
conflict  as  the  result  of  commitment  prob-
lems  that  prevent  socially  desirable  agree-
ments  between  fighting  sides,  has  barely 
been examined.
Third, theories seldom specify the empiri-
cal  predictions  that  can  test  between  com-





maximizing  actors  with  systematic  defects 
in  decision  making  or  expectations  forma-
tion; strategic interactions between multiple 






























Sources: Figure  displays  the  results  of  a  Fan  regression  of  the  incidence  of  civil  war  on  GDP  per  capita 
percentiles  (bandwidth = 0.3,  bootstrapped  standard  errors).  Population  and  GDP  data  are  drawn  from 
the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008). Civil war incidence is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO 
armed conflict database (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2007).
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lead to better empirical testing if and when 
it  better  specifies  the  empirical  predictions 
that distinguish between models.
Fourth,  further  cross-country  regres-
sions  will  only  be  useful  if  they  distinguish 
between competing explanations using more 
credible econometric methods  for establish-
ing  causality.  Up  to  now  this  literature  has 
been  enormously  provocative  but  has  faced 
equally  important  limitations:  convincing 
causal  identification  of  key  relationships  is 
rare;  robustness  to  alternative  specifications 
or assumptions  is  seldom explored; country-
years  are  often  assumed  to  be  independent 
units  in  time and space; measurement error 
is  rarely  addressed;  an  absence  of  evidence 
about particular effects has often been inter-
preted as evidence of  absence;  and  theories 
of  individual  or  armed  group  behavior  are 
tested  at  the  country  level  despite  obvious 
aggregation  difficulties.  It  would  be  easy  to 
conclude that the cross-country literature has 
been  exhausted,  but  that  would  go  too  far. 
We highlight new macro-level  research  that 
addresses some of these challenges head on.
Fifth,  we  believe  the  most  promising 
avenue for new empirical research is on the 
subnational  scale,  analyzing  conflict  causes, 
conduct,  and  consequences  at  the  level  of 
armed  groups,  communities,  and  individu-
als. We refer mainly to the blossoming num-
ber  of  microeconomic  statistical  studies  of 
armed  conflict  and  combatants,  as  well  as 
to  the  integration  of  quantitative  evidence 
with case and historical analysis. The empiri-
cal microeconomic work sometimes employs 
more  credible  research  designs,  yet  so  far 
the  results  are  scattered and many findings 
may be context-dependent. More studies are 
exactly what is needed. In our view, the most 
interesting  directions  for  research  include 
the  internal  organization  of  armed  groups, 
rebel  governance  of  civilians,  the  strategic 
use of  violence,  counterinsurgency  strategy, 






take  a  more  systematic  approach  to  under-
standing  war’s  economic  consequences.  An 
episode  of  civil  conflict,  not  its  absence,  is 
the  norm  in  most  countries,  and  that  war 
may  be  a  nation’s  most  important  histori-
cal  event.  Yet  what  those  effects  imply  for 
long-run  economic  development  is  unclear. 






sions  is  possible.  War’s  impacts  on  human 
capital  (including  education,  nutrition,  and 
health), however, are often more persistent. 
Like  the  “causes”  literature,  research  into 
“consequences” is beginning to benefit from 
better  micro-level  data  and  greater  use  of 
experimental  or  quasi-experimental  varia-
tion.  Viewed  through  the  lens  of  economic 
growth theory, however, there remain more 
gaps  than  solid  conclusions  in  our  under-
standing  of  postwar  recovery.  Both  theory 
and  evidence  are  weakest  in  assessing  the 
impact of civil war on the fundamental driv-
ers  of  long-run  economic  performance—
institutions,  technology,  and  culture—even 
though these may govern whether a society 
recovers, stagnates, or plunges back into war. 
Finally,  in  pursuit  of  all  these  objectives, 
much  is  to  be  gained  from  collecting  new 




different  goals.  Collier  and  Hoeffler  focus 
 in-depth  on  a  set  of  core  macroeconomic 
questions.  Our  piece  brings  in  a  broader 
range of research questions and approaches, 
including  an  overview  of  the  large  conflict 
literature  in  political  science,  and  a  critical 
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but hopeful view of the new applied micro-
economic work in conflict, probably the sin-
gle most promising  research  frontier  in our 
view.  We  also  focus  on  the  theoretical  and 
econometric limitations of existing work. We 
believe  a  number  of  the  arguments  in  this 
article  are novel or have never before been 
assembled  in  a  single  place,  including  the 
discussion  of  specific  directions  for  future 
research.
The rest of  the paper  is organized as  fol-
lows. On civil war causes, section 2 surveys 
theoretical advances and section 3 covers the 




gests  strategies  to  sustain  intellectual  prog-
ress in this emerging field.
2.  Theories of Armed Conflict
Newspaper  reports,  historical  accounts, 
and  econometric  work  overflow  with 
 explanations  for  conflict:  ancient  hatreds 
incite  violence;  oil  wealth  breeds  separat-
ism;  trade  shocks  trigger  insurrections; 
income  inequality  leads  to  class  warfare. 
Surveying  the  vast  literature  on  civil  war, 
one  feels  caught  in  a  complex  web  of  root 
and proximate causes (not to mention endo-
geneity). In this context, the principal con-
tribution  of  formal  economic  theory  has 
been  to clarify and  systematize  this  tangle 
of  material  explanations.  Models  from 
both  economics  and  political  science  have 
reduced  varied  accounts  of  civil war onset 
to a few common logics, each of which can 
be approximated  in a parsimonious  frame-
work  of  self-interested,  wealth-maximizing 
groups  or  individuals.  We  first  review  the 
seminal  theories  of  civil  war,  then  other 
influential  branches  of  the  theoretical  lit-
erature, and wrap up this section with our 
views on promising directions.
2.1  Insurrection as Competition for 
Resources
Models of armed conflict depart from the 
assumptions  of  standard  economic  theory 
in  at  least  three  ways:  property  rights  are 
neither  well-defined  nor  automatically  pro-





The  contest  model,  the  workhorse  of  the 
formal  conflict  literature,  originated  with 
Trygve  Haavelmo  (1954),  and  was  popu-
larized  by  Jack  Hirshleifer  (1988;  1989), 




production  versus  appropriation;  Garfinkel 
and Skaperdas (2007) summarize the permu-
tations  and  mechanics  of  two-party  contest 
models  embedded  in  a  general  equilibrium 
framework.  While  production  is  modeled 
in  the  standard  manner,  appropriation  is 
modeled  using  a  “contest  success  function” 
where  inputs  (e.g.,  guns,  G)  translate  into 
a  probability  of  fighting  side  1  winning,  p1, 
and consuming  the opponent  (side 2’s) eco-




refers  to  side  1’s  weapons,  G2  refers  to  2’s 
weapons, and m captures the effectiveness of 
weaponry in determining the victor:
(1)    p1 (G1, G2) =  
 G 1 
m 
 ________ 
 G 1 
m +  G 2 m 
 .
Contest models boast at  least one robust 
prediction:  the  odds  of  winning  increase 
with the relative effectiveness of that side’s 
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fighting  technology.  Technology  is  defined 
broadly  in this  literature,  including any fac-
tor that influences effectiveness, from skillful 







ers  as  unitary  actors.  Hershel  I.  Grossman 
(1991) departs  slightly, considering  the case 
of  a  single  ruler  and  many  citizens,  each 
of  whom  can  either  produce  or  predate.5 
Grossman’s  move  from  unitary  actors  to 
 representative  households  (assumed  unable 
to coordinate their activities) does not greatly 
change the conclusions of the contest model, 
but  it  does  highlight  the  importance  of  the 
individual  participation  problem:  armed 
group leaders must motivate citizens to sol-
dier for their side. One immediate insight is 
that  participation  in  soldiering  rises  as  the 
opportunity cost of fighting falls. 
These  models  thus  predict  that  poverty 
lowers  individual  incentives for maintaining 
order,  as  soldiering  increases  with  the  rela-
tive  returns  to  fighting  versus  production. 
Can  this  prediction  account  for  the  cross-
country  correlation  between  poverty  and 
civil war? In fact, the theoretical connection 
between  income and armed civil  conflict  is 
not so clear cut. In contest models the win-
ning  party  consumes  the  resources  of  both 
the  state  and  the  losers.  On  the  one  hand, 
the  greater  the  national  wealth  (whether 
from  taxes,  assets  like natural  resources,  or 
external transfers), the more there is to fight 
over and thus, in standard formulations, the 
greater  the   equilibrium  effort  devoted  to 
fighting rather than producing (e.g., Garfinkel 




the  absence  of  resources—natural  or  oth-
erwise—makes  production  less  individually 
attractive than fighting, but also means there 
is a smaller pie to fight over. James D. Fearon 
(2007)  notes  that  these  opposing  wealth 
effects cancel out in some cases: if state reve-
nues are drawn entirely from taxes on citizen 






model  these  potentially  opposing  effects  in 
a  two-sector  model  of  the  economy.  In  the 
capital-intensive  sector,  an  income  shock 
increases  the  value  of  controlling  the  state 
without  increasing  wages  and  the  opportu-
nity  cost of fighting;  the opposite  is  true of 
a  shock  to  the  labor-intensive  sector.  Thus 
in the first case conflict risk increases, while 
in the second it falls. Timothy J. Besley and 
Torsten  Persson  (2008a;  forthcoming)  use 
a  related  framework  to  model  the  impact 
of  import  and  export  commodity  prices 
on  government  revenues  and  rents,  as  well 
as  on  labor  incomes.  They  conclude  that 
terms  of  trade  volatility  in  either  direction 
may   stimulate  repression  and  armed  con-





ble  aspect  is  the  authors’  attempt  to  link 
these sharp theoretical predictions to cross-
country  evidence,  and  we  return  to  their 
empirical  findings  below.  Both  papers  also 
suggest  that  the distribution of  income and 
wealth—whether  across  individuals  or  sec-
tors—is  central  in  explaining  the   economic 




11Blattman and Miguel: Civil War
more likely when state wealth is easily appro-
priated  or  divorced  from  the  citizenry,  as 
with some natural  resource wealth and  for-
eign aid flows. We revisit this issue below.
2.2  Why Fight? Information Asymmetry 
and Incomplete Contracting
One drawback of the typical contest model 
is  that  insurrection  is  never  fully  deterred; 
arming and fighting always occur in equilib-
rium. There is typically no decision to fight: 
arming  and  fighting  are  one  and  the  same. 





Creating  and  arming  organizations  is 
costly  and  wars  are  destructive  and  risky. 




The  possibility  of  bargaining  under  the 










where  conflict  outbreaks  depend  on  shifts 
in  the  military  capacity  of  a   revolutionary 
7  Bargaining  models  of  conflict  proceed  from  micro-
economic  theories  of  bargaining  where  parties  have  the 
option of resorting to costly conflict if bargaining breaks 
down  (see  John  Kennan  and  Robert  Wilson  1993  for  a 
comprehensive survey). Union–firm wage negotiation and 
pretrial  legal  settlement  in wealthy  countries  have been 
the two most studied cases. Conflict models, however, do 
not assume  that  contracts will be enforced once  signed, 
further  complicating  the  negotiation.  Barry  R.  Posen 





always  behave  rationally—decisions  might 
be based on emotion, or leaders may not fully 
calculate benefits  and  risks  (bounded  ratio-
nality). Second, leaders may be fully rational 
but  not  internalize  the  full  cost  of  conflict 
because of political agency problems. Third, 
leaders  might  be  rational  and  internalize 
costs, but find war unavoidable nonetheless.
Almost  all  theoretical  work  focuses  on 
this  third  case.  Fearon  highlights  three 
mechanisms  consistent  with  “rational  war”: 
(i) asymmetric information,  including  pri-
vate  information  about  military  strength, 
and  the  strategic  incentive  to  misrepresent 
it  to  potential  opponents;8  (ii)  commitment 
problems, especially the inability of the par-
ties  to  commit  to deals  in  the  absence of  a 
third-party  enforcer;  and  (iii)  issue indivis-
ibilities,  whereby  some  issues  do  not  admit 
 compromise.  We  will  follow  the  literature 
and focus attention on the first two.9
2.2.1  Information Asymmetries
War  can  occur  when  one  side  overesti-
mates  its  ability  to  win,  or  underestimates 
its  opponent’s  strength  (Powell  2002).  But 
asymmetric  information  is generally  insuffi-
cient cause for war. After all, if both  parties 
have an incentive to make a deal, they should 
also  have  incentives  to  gather  information 





explanation  in  most  cases.  However,  Ron  E.  Hassner 
(2003) argues that the indivisibility of sacred spaces may 
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 rational  actors,  accurate  disclosure  of  infor-
mation must also be impaired. An incentive to 
misrepresent one’s strength is the most com-
monly  theorized  mechanism,  such  as  when 
a  state  exaggerates  its  strength  and  engages 
in  (inefficient)  war  in  order  to  deter  future 
opponents  from  insurrection.10  To  take  an 
interstate  war  case  as  an  example,  Saddam 
Hussein’s exaggeration of Iraq’s stock of weap-
ons of mass destruction in 2002 could be seen 
as  an  effort  to  mislead  opponents  and  deter 
invasion—an effort that, nevertheless, failed.
Such accounts are plausible but likely offer 
only  half  an  explanation.  For  one,  relative 
military strength should reveal itself quickly 
on the battlefield. Information problems thus 





and  Ray  (2001)  develop  a  multiplayer  con-
test,  where  each  has  imperfect  information 
about the others’ costs of conflict. With four 
or  more  players,  Pareto-improving  social 
decision  making  is  impossible  and  conflict 
ensues.  Thus  information  asymmetries  may 
be even more hazardous than the basic two-
player  models  would  suggest.  Ray  (2009) 




even  in  a  world  with  complete  contracts. 
Societies  divide  along  multiple  lines—by 
class, geography, religion, or ethnicity—and 
while  society  can  arrange  a  set  of  transfers 
10  For  instance,  Barbara  F.  Walter  (2006)  shows  that 
ethnic groups are more  likely  to seek self-determination 









that  simultaneously prevents  conflicts  along 
all divisions simultaneously.11
Also promising are recent attempts to inte-
grate  asymmetric  information  with  other 
theoretical  mechanisms.  Sylvain  Chassang 
and Gerard Padro-i-Miquel’s (2008a, 2008b, 
2009)  work  incorporates  such  asymmetry 




present  value  of  victory.  The  model  thus 
implies that in dire economic circumstances 
groups predate upon one another since they 
have  less  to  lose  than  in periods where  the 
returns  to  production  are  higher.  Yet  con-
flict  is  also  possible  in  better  economic 
times as asymmetric information on the true 
economic conditions, and first-strike advan-




economic  shocks;  higher  and  less  volatile 
national  incomes  are  associated  with  less 
conflict; and expected future income growth 
reduces the risk of war today.13










production destroyed  in a civil war; P  is  the odds  that a 
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Dal Bó and Powell  (2009) also show that 
asymmetric  information  can  lead  to  war  in 
the  context  of pervasive  commitment prob-
lems  without  relying  on  global  games.  The 





fail  in  periods  of  lower  economic  activity, 






a  stronger  position  for  future  aggression). 
Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom (2004) 
develop  a  related  imperfect  commitment 
model,  in  which  private  information  about 
each  fighting  side’s  propensity  to  arm  can 
lead  to arms  races with probability close  to 
one.
2.2.2  Commitment Problems and   
 Incomplete Contracting
The  most  intriguing  theories  of  civil  war 
focus  on  the  cases  where  credible  commit-
ments  to  peace  or  redistribution  cannot  be 
made  even  with  complete  information—
that is, at least one side faces an incentive to 
renege once a settlement is reached (Walter 
1997).  Such  circumstances  include  military 
scenarios  with  a  first-strike  advantage,  and 
instances where waging war  today can pre-
vent  one’s  opponent  from  gaining  military 
strength in the future.
Powell  (2006)  shows  formally  that  each 




ernment  that  is  attempting  to  “buy  off”  a 
strong rebel group with transfers to secure 
peace.  When  the  state  returns  to  relative 
strength— perhaps  because  of  a  rebound 
in  economic  activity,  foreign  aid  or  com-
modity  revenues—it  will  be  tempted  to 
renege on its earlier bargain, thus limiting 
the  amount  it  can  credibly promise  to  the 
rebel  group  today.  If  this  time-consistent 
but more modest transfer is less than what 
the rebels can gain by fighting  today,  they 
will  wage  war  now  to  lock  in  the  highest 
possible payoff.
Similarly,  a  commitment  problem  arises 
when  one  party  can  permanently  alter 
the  strategic  balance  of  power  by  waging 
war  now  (Garfinkel  and  Skaperdas  2000; 
Michael  McBride  and  Skaperdas  2007; 
Powell  2006).  If  going  to  war  weakens  or 
even eliminates  a  rebel group  for  all  time, 
the state will gain a peace dividend since it 
no  longer needs to spend on arms to deter 
future  conflict.  Thus  the  state  has  reason 
to wage bloody but  short conflicts  if peace 
deals are not credible.14
The  commitment  problem  directly  sug-
gests  that  civil  war  is  more  likely  to  occur 
when  there  are  limits  to  conflict  resolution 
and contract enforcement. Since formal legal 
and  state  institutions  presumably  help  to 
enforce  commitments  intertemporally,  soci-
eties with weak government institutions and 
few checks and balances on executive power 
should  empirically  be  those  most  likely  to 
experience violent civil conflict (e.g., Fearon 
and  Laitin  2003;  Eliana  La  Ferrara  and 
Robert H. Bates 2001; Skaperdas 2008). This 
14  This  approach  suggests  that  the  likelihood  of  war 
is  affected  by  each  side’s  valuation  of  the  future  versus 
the present. The  risk of  future  retaliation—the “shadow 
of  the  future”—should  deter  sides  from  conflict.  When 
future  returns depend on present  success on  the battle-





and  decreases  it  in  the  second  and  third  (McBride  and 
Skaperdas 2007; Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos 
1996). 
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relationship may partially explain the wide-
spread  occurrence  of  lengthy  civil  wars  in 
sub-Saharan Africa, a region notorious for its 
weak  state  capacity  and  limited  legal  infra-




cause  for  civil  conflict.  The  theory  implies 
that conflict is at least twice conditional: first 
on weak  institutions, and second, on  future 
shifts  in  relative  power  across  the  fighting 
sides.  Future  empirical  models  must  begin 
to  take  these  issues  into account more seri-
ously in testing.
In  terms  of  policy,  the  theory  suggests 
that  enforcement  of  contracts  by  the  inter-
national  community  can  potentially  substi-
tute  for  weak  domestic  institutions  (Walter 
1997).  Interventions  might  include  armed 
peacekeepers,  the  provision  of  guaranteed 
financial transfers to rebels by outside inter-
national  agencies,  and  the  threat  of  pun-
ishment  (including  trade  sanctions,  asset 
freezes, and bombing) if either side reneges 
on the peace deal.
External  interventions  could  also  have 
the opposite effect, however, and prevent an 
ongoing war from reaching a credible peace 
agreement.  For  instance,  the  recent  pros-
ecution  of  Charles  Taylor  (former  warlord 
and  President  of  Liberia)  and  indictment 
of  Joseph  Kony  (head  of  Uganda’s  Lord’s 
Resistance  Army)  by  international  courts 
could make postwar power-sharing deals for 
rebels  less  credible  in  the  future,  and  thus 
extend  current  civil  wars  if  the  rebels  have 
no  guarantee  that  putting  down  arms  will 
shield them from prosecution in The Hague. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  possibility  that  an 
international  indictment  could  be  dropped 





2.3  The Microfoundations of Group 
Conflict
Contest  models  and  rationalist  theories 
of  civil  war  rely  upon  groups  behaving  as 
unitary  actors,  strong  assumptions  consid-





2.3.1  Civil War and the Participation   
 Problem
Classic  solutions  to  the  collective  action 
problem  use  “selective  incentives”  to  moti-
vate participation, with material and pecuni-
ary incentives the focus of most models (e.g., 
Grossman  1999).  Such  incentives  include 
wages,  opportunities  to  loot,  promises  of 
future  reward,  or  physical  protection  from 
harm.  Economic  inequality  provides  a  pos-





ity  motivates  participation  in  rebellion  not 
for  private  gain,  but  because  it  generates 
frustration over inequality or the destabiliza-
tion  of  traditional  social  systems  (James  C. 
Davies 1962; Ted Robert Gurr 1971; Jeffery 
M.  Paige  1975;  Roger  D.  Petersen  2001; 
James  C.  Scott  1976).  By  these  accounts, 
poverty,  income inequality, and unmet eco-
nomic expectations may  indeed be  the root 
causes  of  conflict,  but  the  more  proximate 
explanations  are  better  described  as  griev-
ances.  Rather  than  deny  material  motiva-
tions,  these accounts provide an alternative 
















What  these  micro-level  approaches  often 
ignore,  however,  is  that  fighting  is  not  the 
only means by which individuals and groups 
can  pursue  political  and  economic  change. 
Walter  (2004)  argues  that  the  absence  of 
a  nonviolent  means  for  achieving  change 
is  also  often  necessary  to  incite  rebellion. 
Nonviolent  political  alternatives  could  be 
incorporated  into  the  decision  framework 
facing  citizens,  leaders,  and  armed  groups, 
generating  testable  predictions  about  the 




pal–agent  framework.  A  leading  example  is 
Scott  Gates  (2002),  who  models  how  rebel 
leaders  can  use  material  incentives  along-
side  ethnic  appeals  to  motivate  citizens  to 
join and exert effort in the rebellion (i.e., to 























as  selective  incentives. Coercive  recruitment 
is  especially  common  in  African  insurgen-
cies where,  in the absence of a shared social 
basis for mobilizing rural support, rebel lead-
ers  resort  to  the  only  tool  at  their  disposal 
(Thandika Mkandawire 2002). Michael Suk-









coercion  on  low  productivity  recruits  (espe-
cially children). Yet these models are unlikely 
to capture the complex individual motivations 
underlying  participation  in  armed  groups, 
however,  and  thus  constitute  an  important 
area for further research. 
2.3.2  The Formation of Competing   
 Coalitions
The  models  reviewed  assume  that  rebel 
and government groups exist and are actively 
engaged  in  combat.  They  do  not  tackle  the 
issue of how competing groups form and why 
they  cohere.  An  emerging  literature  based 
on the noncooperative theory of endogenous 
coalitions  explores  the  distributional  basis 
of  group  formation.  These  models  typically 
assume  that  group  action  is  more  efficient 
than  individual  action,  providing  citizens 
with an incentive to join forces. These mod-
els also allow for conflict within each group 
over  the  distribution  of  their  joint  surplus, 
conflict  that  can  be  costly  for  the  individ-
ual.  Stable  groups  are  those  that  have  low-
cost  mechanisms  for  distributing  the  gains, 
such  as  property  rights  norms.  The  size  of 
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stable groups depends on the relative effec-
tiveness  of  groups  at  managing  both  inter-
group and intra-group conflict (e.g., Francis 
Bloch, Sántiago Sánchez-Pagés, and Raphael 
Soubeyran  2006;  Garfinkel  2004).  This 
approach  is  a  promising  source  of  micro-
foundations  for  the  commitment  problems 
discussed  above,  since  the  institutions  that 
allow for within-group cooperation may also 
mitigate intergroup conflict.
Relaxing  the  unitary  actor  assumption 
could  also  expand  the  range  of  rational 
explanations for armed conflict. Information 
problems  within  groups  could  lead  to  bar-
gaining breakdowns (just as was the case for 
asymmetric information across groups). Field 
generals  have  incentives  to  mislead  civilian 
leaders about the capability of their military 
forces if they hope to keep the fighting going 
for  longer  than citizens would  like  (to keep 
military budgets at high levels, for instance).
Alternatively,  the  possibility  that  groups 
might  split  could  exacerbate  commitment 





talks  and  cause  such  talks  to  fail.  Stephen 
John Stedman (1997) argues that the greatest 
risk  for peace negotiations  comes  from  such 















2.3.3  Ethnic Groups and Conflict
Ethnic nationalism is popularly viewed as 
the leading source of group cohesion and (by 
extension)  intergroup  civil  conflict;  of  709 
minority ethnic groups identified around the 
world, at least 100 had members engage in an 
ethnically  based  rebellion  against  the  state 
during 1945 to 1998 (Fearon 2006). But why 
do  ethnic  groups  themselves  form,  cohere, 
and  sometimes  engage  in  such  violence?  A 
full review of the literature on the formation 
of  ethnicity  and  ethnic  conflict  is  beyond 
the scope of this paper, but an outline of the 
main ideas merits discussion.18
“Primordialist”  arguments  stress  the 
deep  cultural,  biological  or  psychological 
nature  of  ethnic  cleavages,  whereby  con-
flict  is  rooted  in  intense  emotional  reac-
tions and feelings of mutual threat (Donald 
L.  Horowitz  1985).  Economic  models  that 
assume  individuals  prefer  to  mingle  with 
co-ethnics  (or  share  political  preferences) 
might  be  construed  as  primordialist  in 
nature  (Alesina,  Reza  Baqir,  and  William 
Easterly 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; 
Esteban  and  Ray  1999).  There  are  clear 






18  For  overviews  of  ethnic  mobilization  and  violence 



















able  characteristics  that  allow  outsiders  to 
be  excluded  from  public  goods  (Francesco 
Caselli  and  Wilbur  John  Coleman  2006; 
Fearon  and  Laitin  1996;  Edward  Miguel 
and  Mary  Kay  Gugerty  2005).  Fearon  and 
Laitin  (1996)  show  that better within-group 
cohesion  can  facilitate  peace  deals  between 
ethnic groups. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) 
also  speculate  that  ethnically  homogenous 





have  a  distinct  advantage  over  class  alli-






Finally,  “modernist”  theories  stress  that 
ethnic conflict arises when groups excluded 
from  social  and  political  power  begin  to 
experience  economic  modernization  (Bates 
1986; Ernest Gellner 1983)—a situation that 
parallels Powell’s (2006) account of shifts in 
future  power  leading  to  bargaining  break-
downs today.
2.4  Challenges and Areas for Further Work
Most real-world disputes are settled, even 
among antagonistic ethnic groups. Thus the 
theoretical  apparatus  described  above  is 
plausible: conflict is rooted in endemic com-
petition  for  resources  across  groups,  with 






2.4.1  Disentangling Competing Accounts
Existing  formal  theories  of  conflict  yield 
falsifiable predictions, but few articulate the 
precise empirical tests that would distinguish 
among  alternative  mechanisms.  Income 
volatility  is one example. In  the  theories we 
consider above, a negative aggregate income 
shock is associated with an increase in armed 
conflict  in  various  models,  including  those 
that  emphasize  the  diminished  opportunity 
costs of soldiering (Gates 2002, Chassang and 
Padro-i-Miquel  2009),  weaker  state  repres-
sive capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003), or the 
role  of  asymmetric  information  (Chassang 





Grossman  1999).  Finally,  income  volatil-
ity  in  either direction  could  inhibit  credible 











ment over  single-sector models,  yet  even  so, 









ential  effects on  civil   conflict  depending  on 













rial  rewards  and  punishments.  One  implica-
tion is that we have not derived the falsifiable 
predictions that distinguish between material 
and   non-material   theoretical  accounts.  Thus 
we  cannot  discard  non-economic  explana-
tions  for  conflict. Take  the  role of  economic 
inequality,  for  example.  The  unequal  distri-






collective  action.20  While  the  reduced-form 





Christopher  Cramer  (2002)  critiques  the 
conflict literature for its tendency to use such 
reduced-form  empirical  relationships  to  but-
tress  economic  interpretations,  arguing  that 
the  underlying  relationships  between  eco-
nomic, social, and psychological factors are far 
more complex. He stresses Antonio Gramsci’s 
(1971)  definition  of  “economism”:  presenting 
20  Barrington  Moore  (1993),  for  instance,  has  argued 
that  Nazi  fascism  and  anticapitalist  rhetoric  stirred 
anger  in German peasants over  the perceived control of 
resources by a  supposedly hostile  Jewish elite. A similar 
dynamic  was  at  work  during  the  anti-Tutsi  genocide  in 
Rwanda in 1994 (Scott Straus 2006).
causes  as  immediately  operative  that  in  fact 
only  operate  indirectly,  and  thus  overstating 
proximate  causation.  Understanding  these 
complex  relationships  is  crucially  important 
for  preventing  armed  conflicts.  Innovative 
ways  of  modeling  and  measuring  individual 
political  grievances  are  required  to  make 
progress on  this agenda. Yet  in  the end, our 
measures may fail to capture the relevant vari-
ation. Grievances are fluid and the case litera-
ture points  to  the evolution of  identities and 
norms during wartime (Wood 2003a).  
Recent  behavioral  and  experimental  eco-
nomic research argues that notions of fairness 
and  grievance  are  salient  in  individual  deci-
sion  making.  There  is  growing  lab  evidence 
that  individuals  have  a  taste  for  punishing 
social  norms  violations  and  are  willing  to 
incur  nontrivial  private  costs  to  do  so.  This 
willingness to punish unfair behavior appears 
to  have  neural-physiological  underpinnings 
(Dominique J.-F. de Quervain et al. 2004) and 
is consistent with preferences for equity (Gary 
Charness  and  Matthew  Rabin  2002;  Ernst 
Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt 1999). Jung-Kyoo 
Choi  and  Samuel  Bowles  (2007)  argue  that 
altruistic preferences  favoring one’s  in-group 
may  have  conferred  an  evolutionary  advan-





punishing  others  monetarily,  but  the  experimental  eco-
nomics  literature  has  not  to  our  knowledge  carried  out 
similar  research  on  individual  preferences  for  inflicting 
violence  on  others.  Given  the  inherent  human  subjects 








is  perceived  as  the  resolution  of  this  fear.  Meanwhile, 
some public health and psychology evidence suggests that 
much violence is “shame-induced” (James Gilligan 2000). 
19Blattman and Miguel: Civil War
2.4.3  Disaggregating Institutions
The commitment problem is a persuasive 
explanation  for  civil  war.  Unfortunately,  we 
have  a  poor  understanding  of  the  specific 
political  and  legal  institutions  capable  of 
enforcing commitments and facilitating com-
promise  between  competing  groups.  Some 
theories emphasize  the  importance of mar-
ket  promotion  and  tax  levying  (Besley  and 
Persson  2008b),  and  others  property  rights 
and  the  rule  of  law  (Garfinkel  2004).  Still 
others  emphasize  the  role  of  international 
institutions and the threat of external inter-




lizing).  Meanwhile,  Powell  (2006)  empha-
sizes  institutions  that  help  manage  rapid 
shifts  in power, an example of which might 
be  the  ability  of  elites  to  extend  or  retract 
the  democratic  franchise,  as  in  Acemoglu 




Barry  R.  Weingast  (1997),  Bates  (2008) 
and  Bates,  Avner  Greif  and  Smita  Singh 
(2002)  argue  that  the  incentives  and  con-
straints  facing  leaders  are  crucial,  and  in 
particular  that  rulers  loot  the  state  when 
the  long-term  costs  of  doing  so  are  low. 
Institutions  shape  these  costs  as  well  as 
the  ruler’s  time horizon and discount  rate. 
Paradoxically,  institutions  that  extend  a 
ruler’s  horizon,  such  as  the  elimination  of 





sure  for  African  states  to  democratize  in 
the 1990s increased disorder, since it short-
ened leaders’ horizons at the same time that 
foreign  aid  flows  were  reduced;  with  few 
institutional checks on their power, African 
rulers had incentives to predate.
These  arguments  meld  with  a  growing 
comparative  politics  literature  on  state  fail-
ure  and  “warlordism”  in  the  late  twentieth 
century.  In  a  study  of  civil  war  in  Liberia, 
Sierra  Leone,  and  Guinea,  Amos  Sawyer 
(2004,  2005)  emphasizes  the  large  spoils 
from  power  combined  with  the  absence 
of  checks  and  balances  on  the  executive  as 
the  primary  cause  of  war  in  those  nations. 
William Reno (1999) also examines the inter-
nal  dynamics  of  “warlord  states”  in  Sierra 
Leone, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Liberia. Like Bates, Reno argues 
that,  in  the  presence  of  resource  wealth,  a 
weakened  state,  less  foreign  aid,  and  pres-
sures for economic liberalization, strongmen 




2.4.4  The Conduct and Organization of   
 Civil War
Another  important  area  of  study  is  the 
conduct of  rebellion,  investigating what  fac-
tors and initial conditions influence a group’s 
formation,  recruitment  strategies,  fighting 
tactics,  and  internal  organization.  One  goal 
is  to describe  the  logic of civil war and vio-
lence—a  reaction  to  the  view,  popularized 
by  journalism  and  some  international  rela-
tions  scholars,  that  the  brutal  violence  that 
 characterizes much of modern civil warfare is 
a product of illogical barbarism unrestrained 
by  economic,  political  or  social  structures 
(e.g.,  Mary  Kaldor  1999;  Robert  D.  Kaplan 
1994).
Rebel  groups  are  large,  self-sustaining 
indigenous  organizations  in  societies  where 




contract  theory  to  theories  of   recruitment. 
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Some of these, already discussed above, focus 












Armed  group  cohesion  is  the  subject  of  a 
large body of work  in military sociology and 
history.  Rather  than  focusing  on  economic 





zational  devices  include  the  creation  of  new 
identities  among  recruits  and  unit  solidar-
ity  (Richard  A.  Gabriel  and  Paul  L.  Savage 
1979;  Edward  A.  Shils  and  Morris  Janowitz 
1948)  and  systems  of  command  and  control 
(Robert  Sterling  Rush  1999,  2001;  Martin 
Van Creveld 1982). This emphasis on organi-
zation-level dynamics  in state militaries con-
trasts  with  the  emphasis  on  individual-level 
motives often used to explain participation in 




military  and  guerrilla  groups,  and  Wood 
(2008), who discusses how armed groups have 
22  The  contrast  between  the  Revolutionary  United 
Front (RUF), funded through diamond mining and smug-
gling,  and  the  community-supported  Civilian  Defense 
Forces  (CDF)  in  Sierra  Leone’s  recent  civil  war  pro-
vides an  illustration of  this divergence. L. Alison Smith, 
Catherine  Gambette  and  Thomas  Longley  (2004)  show 









armed  guerrilla  groups,  each  with  little 




for  rebels  over  some  size  range—in  other 
words, above some size, each additional rebel 
increases  the  probability  the  rebel  group  is 
detected,  denounced,  or  destroyed  by  the 
government,  and  this  effect  outweighs  the 
fighting benefits of greater size (at least up to 
some  point).23  Powell  (2007)  is  perhaps  the 
best articulated  formal attempt  to get  inside 
the black box of armed groups’ fighting strat-
egies.  He  models  optimal  military  spending 
across potential targets (e.g., cities or fighting 





violence  directed  at  civilians.24  Jean-Paul 
Azam  (2002,  2006)  formalizes  a  strategic 




simultaneously  generating  spoils  to  reward 
existing  recruits.  The  logic  of  violence 
against civilian populations is the subject of 
a growing literature in political science (see 
Kalyvas  2006  for  a  review).  In  work  based 
on  a  comparative  study  of  irregular  civil 
wars (i.e., guerrilla wars) in the past century, 
Kalyvas (2006) argues that rival sides prefer 
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to  use  selective  rather  than  indiscriminate 
violence  to  punish  “defectors,”  or  civilian 
enemies  and  informers.  In  the  absence  of 
information, both sides rely on local collabo-
rators to denounce defectors. Kalyvas argues 
that  selective  violence—including  violence 
related  to  private,  not  political  motives—is 
most  widespread  in  zones  where  each  side 
holds significant force but lacks full control.25 
Finally,  recent  studies  examine  the  use  of 
sexual violence by armed groups (Dara Kay 
Cohen 2008; Wood 2006; 2009).
This  collection  of  theories  just  scratches 
the  surface  of  the  recruitment  of  fight-
ers  and  organization  of  civil  warfare.  This 
area  remains  one  of  the  most  promising 
and  understudied  areas  in  the  literature 
on  conflict,  and  is  ripe  for  the  application 





2.4.5  Departures from the Rational Model
As  we  discuss  below,  existing  empirical 
models  of  conflict  have  limited  explana-
tory  and  predictive  power.  We  can  draw  at 
least  three  possible  conclusions  from  their 
 relatively  weak  performance.  First,  the 
determinants  of  war  could  be  understood 
within  standard  rational  choice  frameworks 
but simply difficult to measure. In this case 
our prime focus as researchers should be to 
improve  data  and  measurement.  To  some 
extent this is already happening. 
Second,  war  could  have  idiosyncratic 
causes,  attributable  to  chance,  singular  cir-
cumstances,  or  unsystematic  “irrational’ 
behaviors  by  leaders,  encompassing  errors 
in  decision  making,  personality  defects, 
25  In  contrast,  according  to  Kalyvas,  the  most  heav-
ily  contested  zones  are  likely  to  be  relatively  peaceful 
because denunciations will be deterred by the likelihood 
of immediate retribution.
and  so  forth  (Erik  Gartzke  1999).  Such 
an  account  is  not  inconsistent  with  formal 
theory.  Models  are  seldom  intended  to  be 
deterministic but rather to describe general 
tendencies. Civil war outbreak is a relatively 
rare  event  and  thus  it  is  conceivable  that 
the  basic  formal  logic  is  right  but  at  least 
some civil wars are  in  fact costly mistakes. 
Indeed,  the  historical  literature  is  replete 
with  leaders’  passions,  fallibility,  and  ide-
ology;  historians  often  attribute  war  and 
peace  to  the  attributes  of  individuals  like 
Hitler  or  Gandhi.  Some  possibilities  for 
incorporating these issues into formal mod-
els  already  exist.  For  instance,  uncertainty 
over  whether  an  opposition  leader  is  an 
“irrational”  type  would  affect  strategies  in 
models of asymmetric information.
Third, wars could have determinants that 
are  outside  the  simple  rational  framework, 
but systematically so. Some obvious explana-
tions are still consistent with rational models, 
such  as  a  leader’s  failure  to  internalize  the 
full  social  costs of war—a possibility  raised 
by  Fearon  (2004)  and  recently  modeled  by 
Matthew  O.  Jackson  and  Massimo  Morelli 
(2007) in the context of inter-state war. They 
show it only takes one “biased” leader (in the 





ing,  such  as  overestimating  their  chance  of 
winning  (overconfidence),  time-inconsistent 
preferences,  or  other  types  of  predictable 




chological  factors  and  misperception  into 
international relations theory include Robert 
Jervis  (1976)  and  Jack  S.  Levy  (1997),  but, 
to the best of our knowledge, these insights 
have  yet  to  be  applied  to  formal  models  of 
civil war.
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New  empirical  evidence  suggests  that 
political  leaders  often  do  matter.  Benjamin 
F.  Jones  and  Benjamin  A.  Olken  (2009) 
compare  successful  to  failed  assassination 
attempts, and find that the unexpected assas-
sination  of  leaders  tends  to  enflame  low-




so  much  so  that  Massimo  Guidolin  and  La 
Ferrara (2007) use his death in an event study 




evidence  just  cited  means  that  leadership 
cannot be entirely ignored.
This  example  on  the  role  of  leaders  sug-
gests  that  certain  determinants  of  conflict 
outside standard models are observable and 
testable,  and  thus  could  be  a  basis  for  new 
theory. Furthermore, an important possibil-
ity  seldom  discussed  in  the  recent  formal 
theoretical literature is that complex, unsys-
tematic, and difficult  to observe  forces may 
greatly  influence  the  outbreak  of  war,  and 
make  a  single  general  economic  theory  of 






in  the  statistical  analysis  of  relatively  rare 
events. We now turn to the evidence, where 
the  implications  of  these  and  other  estima-
tion challenges are discussed.
3.  Evidence on the Causes of Conflict
The  correlates  of  war  are  by  now  well-
established. Civil war is more likely to occur 
in countries that are poor, are subject to neg-
ative  income  shocks,  have  weak  state  insti-
tutions,  have  sparsely  populated  peripheral 
regions,  and  possess  mountainous  terrain. 
Ultimately,  empirical  work  should  aim  to 
distinguish which of the competing theoreti-
cal  mechanisms  best  explain  the  incidence, 
conduct, and nature of civil war, but this goal 
is  still  far  from  being  realized.26  We  have 
limited  evidence  on  the  relative  influence 
of  the  commitment  problems  and  informa-
tion asymmetries so central to formal theory. 
In  many  cases  it  is  still  not  clear  which  of 
the above correlates actually cause war and 
which are merely symptoms of deeper prob-




Cross-country  regressions  dominate  the 
conflict literature, and no discussion of civil 
war  empirics  is  complete  without  reference 
to  the  seminal  contributions  of  Collier  and 
Hoeffler (1998; 2004) and Fearon and Laitin 
(2003). Collier and Hoeffler  ignited interest 
among  economists—and  heated  disagree-
ment  among  scholars  in  other  fields—with 
a  simple  argument:  political  grievances 
are  universal  but  the  economic  incentives 
to  rebel  are  not,  and  these  latter  factors 
are  often  decisive.  Scores  of  papers  have 
 followed  in  their  footsteps,  most  sharing  a 





Collier  and  Hoeffler  broadly  root  their 
empirical model  in a  contest model of  con-
flict,  and find  several  variables with  robust, 
positive correlations with conflict incidence. 
First,  slow  current  economic  growth  is 
26  Other  recent  reviews  of  the  empirical  literature, 
often  spanning  economics  and  political  science,  include 
Collier  and  Hoeffler  (2007),  Macartan  Humphreys 
(2003), Patricia  Justino  (2007), Kalyvas  (2007), Nicholas 
Sambanis (2002), and Wood (2003a).






ethnic  fractionalization,  income  inequality, 
and  democracy  are  not  statistically  signifi-
cant  predictors  of  conflict  risk  conditional 
on  these other  factors. Collier and Hoeffler 
conclude that economic forces, primarily the 
ability  to  organize  and  finance  a  rebellion 
(as  captured  in  their  economic  growth  and 
schooling variables, and the  ability to exploit 
natural  resources)  most  strongly  predict 
whether civil war occurs.
Fearon  and  Laitin  (2003)  take  a  closely 
related  cross-country  approach.  Their  core 
regression, while not derived explicitly from 
theory, became the standard formulation for 




try  i  in  year  t;  CWit  is  an  indicator  for  the 
incidence  of  civil  war  (which  equals  one  in 
onset and all active war years); yi,t−1 is lagged 
per  capita  income;  and  Xit  is  a  vector  of  K 
population,  geographic,  political  controls 
(including  democracy  measures)  and  social 
variables  (including  ethnic  and  religious 
fractionalization):
(2)    ONSETit = Λ(β0 + β1 CWi,t−1
  + β2 yi,t−1 + X′it βK + εit).
Like  Collier  and  Hoeffler,  Fearon  and 
Laitin  find,  first,  that  conditions  favor-
ing  insurgency,  like  rough  terrain,  increase 
the likelihood of civil war, and second, that 
proxies  for  political  “grievances”  (e.g.,  eth-
nic and cultural diversity) have little predic-
tive power. Yet Fearon and Laitin also argue 
that  proxies  for  state  institutional  capacity 
and  strength—most  importantly,  per  capita 
income—are  robust  predictors  of  civil  war. 





ric  techniques?  Most  importantly,  the  two 
studies  attach  different  interpretations  to 
key variables like per capita income. Collier 
and Hoeffler link it to the opportunity costs 
facing  potential  rebels,  while  Fearon  and 
Laitin  emphasize  its  correlation  with  state 
capacity.  Yet  neither  of  these  two  “pure” 
 interpretations is entirely justified given the 
evidence at hand. The link between income 
levels  and  armed  conflict  is  theoretically 
complex,  and  finer-grained  data—say,  on 
incomes  that  revert  to  the  state  versus  the 
citizenry,  or  actual  longitudinal  measures 
of state capacity—is required to distinguish 
between these interpretations.
Second,  the  authors  differ  in  how  they 
code  civil  wars.  Sambanis  (2004)  examines 
the  four  competing  datasets  and  finds  five 
main differences: (i) in thresholds of violence 
required to be defined as a civil war; (ii) the 
definitions  of  war  beginnings  and  endings; 
(iii)  in  their  treatment of  ‘internationalized’ 




lying  data  sources  they  draw  from.27  Both 
Collier and Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin 
examine conflict onset, albeit with different 
definitions  of  war.  Other  options,  however, 
27  The coding of civil wars and conflicts remains prob-
lematic.  Increases  in  conflict  intensity  are  generally  not 
captured,  except  by  the  25  and  1,000  death  thresholds 
in  the  PRIO/Uppsala  data.  Some  civil  “conflicts”  may 
include low level violence that by other criteria would not 




deaths  (omitting,  for  instance,  civilian  killings,  refugee 
movements, and state repression); and difficulties of dif-
ferentiating conflict lulls from true termination of conflict.
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include conflict incidence (including all years 
of  war  in  the  analysis)  or  conflict  duration. 
These  three  approaches  can  be  applied  to 
at  least  four  different  civil  war  datasets,  to 
create  twelve  possible  dependent  variables. 
These  datasets  do  not  always  agree  on  the 
coding  of  war  and  correlation  coefficients 
across datasets range from 0.96 down to 0.42 
(with an average of 0.68).28 
A  third  source of  inconsistent  results  lies 
in  the  somewhat  ad  hoc  empirical  models 
typically used. In this way the cross-country 
conflict literature mirrors the earlier debate 





ods,  corrections  for  time  dependence,  the 
treatment  of  ongoing  war  years,  the  appro-
priate  estimator  for  rare  events,  the  use  of 
country fixed effects, and so forth.29 
Fourth,  estimates  are  sensitive  to  the 
explanatory  variables  employed.  Hegre  and 
Sambanis  (2006)  test  the  sensitivity of  esti-
mates  to  changes  in  the  conditioning  set, 
using  the  approach  popularized  in  Xavier 
Sala-i-Martin  (1997),  and  identify  a  few 
robust correlates of civil war onset:  low per 
capita  income,  slow  income  growth,  rough 
28  See Sambanis (2004). These correlations of conflict 
onset are likely to exaggerate differences in conflict inci-
dence  (since  datasets  may  disagree  on  the  exact  year  of 
conflict  initiation).  This  difficulty  and  inconsistency  in 
pinpointing onset will frustrate attempts to relate conflict 






29 On  time-dependence  and  dynamics,  see  Nathaniel 
Beck and  Jonathan N. Katz  (2004)  and Beck, Katz,  and 
Richard  Tucker  (1998).  On  logistic  regression  with  rare 




cal  instability,  small  government  militaries, 
and war-prone neighbors. Yet many of these 
variables  are  plausibly  endogenous,  biasing 
other estimates in unknown directions.
Finally,  the  country  level  of  analysis  has 
inherent  limitations.  Individual- and group-
level  conflict  factors,  such  as  poverty  or 
ethnic  hostility,  are  imperfectly  tested  at 
the national  level  (Sambanis 2004).  In  such 
cases, cross-country evidence (or the absence 
of  evidence)  should  be  regarded  with  cau-
tion. As we discuss in the next section, micro-
level data  is  likely  to yield more convincing 




3.1.1  Recent Cross-Country Empirical   
 Advances
Recent  cross-country  research  focuses 
on  improving  causal  identification  and 
measurement.
The search for exogeneity. The correla-
tions of  civil  conflict with both  low  income 
levels and negative income shocks are argu-
ably  the  most  robust  empirical  patterns  in 
the  literature cited above, but the direction 
of  causality  remains  contested.  Even  the 
use of lagged national income growth (as in 
earlier  studies) does not eliminate  this con-
cern,  since  the anticipation of  future politi-
cal instability and conflict can affect current 
30  The  finding  on  population  size  suggests  a  possible 
link  between  population  pressure—with  its  resulting 
resource  scarcity  and  environmental  degradation—and 
civil conflict, a theory that dates back to at least Malthus 
(for  a  review  see  Thomas  F.  Homer-Dixon  1999;  Colin 
H.  Kahl  2006).  This  population  pressure  hypothesis  is 
related  to  the  hypothesis  that  poverty  increases  armed 
civil conflict risk, where rapid population growth could be 
one driver of lower per capita income. The link between 
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investment  behavior  and  thus  living  stan-
dards.31  Another  way  of  saying  this  is  that 
there are likely to be permanent fixed differ-
ences between countries that are correlated 
with  their  income  levels,  economic  growth 
rates, and civil war.
To  address  this  concern,  several  papers 
seek to isolate exogenous variation in income. 
In  sub-Saharan  Africa,  where  most  house-
holds  rely  on  rain-fed  agriculture,  falling 
rainfall  and  drought  cause  large  reductions 





some  specifications)  in  country  i  in  year  t, 
git denotes per  capita  income growth, Xit  is 
a  vector of population, geographic, political 
controls and social variables, αi is a country 




(3)    CWit = αi + X′it β + γ0 git 
 + γ1 gi,t−1 + δi yeart + εit  .
They  use  annual  country  rainfall  growth 
rates (current and lagged one year) as instru-




in  other  world  regions,  where  much  less 
economic  activity  relies  on  rain-fed  agri-
culture,  making  Africa  the  natural  region 
for  the  application  of  this  approach.  In  the 
IV  specification  they  find  that  a  5  percent 
drop  in  income growth  increases  the  likeli-
hood of a civil conflict in the following year 
by up to 10 percentage points, or nearly one 
half.  Antonio  Ciccone  (2008)  reaches  the 
same conclusion  in a modified  specification 
using log rainfall rather than rainfall growth 
as  the  key  explanatory  variable.  This  main 
effect is not substantially dampened in coun-
tries  with  stronger  democratic  institutions, 
greater ethno–linguistic fractionalization, or 
oil exporters. 
This  analysis  highlights  the  role  that 
income  shocks  play  in  generating  armed 
conflict  in  Africa.  Unfortunately,  this 
econometric  strategy  once  again  does  not 
allow  the  authors  to  definitively  pin  down 
a unique  causal mechanism:  rainfall  shocks 




government  revenues  and  state  capacity,  or 
both.32 
Price shocks provide an alternative means 
to  study  the  income–conflict  relationship. 
Here  the  evidence  is  mixed.  For  instance, 
Besley  and  Persson  (2008a)  exploit  interna-
tional commodity price movements to inves-
tigate  civil  war  causes.  Consistent  with  the 




are  also  associated with  increased  civil war 
prevalence,  since  growing  government  rev-
enue  makes  seizing  the  state   increasingly
31  For  a  discussion  of  this  theoretical  point,  see 
Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel (2007).
32   There may also be other violations of the exclusion 
restriction unrelated  to economic  factors,  for  instance  if 
rainfall directly affects the costs of fighting. Moreover, the 
authors  only  study  one  type  of  economic  shock,  mainly 
affecting  the  rural  sector;  variation  in  national  income 
induced  by  changes  in  industrial  production  or  foreign 
aid could conceivably have different impacts. Future work 
should also examine the possibility that droughts lead to 
violence  between  settled  and  nomadic  groups,  a  salient 
issue missed in the existing civil war data.
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attractive.33  However,  Samuel  Bazzi  and 
Blattman (2010) reexamine the effect of trade 









and  to  specification.  Unlike  rainfall,  these 
shocks show a less consistent relation to con-
flict,  whether  they  are  experienced  mainly 
by  farmers  (i.e.,  agricultural  commodities), 
the government (minerals and energy), or in 
the aggregate. Nor do trade shocks robustly 
predict  political  instability  in  Africa  when 





incomes  on  conflict.  This  question—why 
massive trade and income shocks do not seem 
















instability  (due  to  collapsing  revenues)  or  by  heighten-
ing  inequality.  In  this  case,  a  reduced  form  approach  is 
less vulnerable to bias than the instrumental variable one 
(Bazzi  and  Blattman  2010).  Political  instability  in  even 
moderate-sized  commodity  producers  could  affect  the 
world  price,  making  commodity  price  shocks  less  exog-
enous than rainfall.




causal  inference by  focusing on  a  single,  or 
small  number  of,  exogenous  conflict  deter-
minants and plausible instruments for them 
rather  than  running  horse  races  between 
many endogenous variables. 
More detailed and theoretically moti-
vated measurement.  Recent  developments 
in  the  literature  on  natural  resources  and 
conflict  illustrate  the  value  of  better  mea-
surement.34  David  K.  Leonard  and  Straus 
(2003) emphasize the importance of enclave 
production, which has little connection to the 
productivity  of  most  citizens  (and  therefore 
may be less vulnerable to civil war violence). 
More accurate data have been compiled on 
oil  production  and  reserves  (Humphreys 
2005), while others have done the same for 












of  the  existence  of  more  rents  to  fight  over 
and the availability of easy finance, which are 
also echoed by  some case  studies  (Philippe 
Le Billon 2001, 2005; Ross 2004a). 
There remains a need for better measures 
of  political  grievances,  institutional  quality 
and  even  poverty.  Consider  political  griev-
ances first. Much has been made of the weak 
cross-country  association  between  armed 
conflict  and  grievance  proxies,  including 
34  For a review of  the  literature, see Michael L. Ross 
(2004b, 2006) and Humphreys (2005).
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economic  inequality  and  ethnic  fraction-
alization  (e.g.,  Hegre  and  Sambanis  2006; 
Laitin  2007).  This  weak  association  is  sur-
prising given the robust negative relationship 
between  economic  performance  and  some 
social  divisions,  as  well  as  popular  percep-
tions  of  their  centrality  in  driving  conflict 
(Alesina  and  La  Ferrara  2005;  Alesina  and 




conflict  is  conditional  on  particular  institu-
tional or historical contexts, then we should 




A  more  fundamental  concern  is  that 
the  existing  proxies  are  theoretically  inap-
propriate.  National  income  per  capita,  for 
instance,  may  not  capture  the  relevant 
aspects  of  poverty  that  drive  fighting,  such 
as the  proportion of rural male youth living 
close to subsistence income. Most measures 
of  ethnic  and  religious  divisions  are  used 
principally because they are straightforward 
to  calculate,  rather  than  because  they  are 
theoretically  convincing.  Indices  of  ethnic 
fractionalization  have  been  questioned  as  a 
meaningful  proxy  for  ethnic  tensions  (e.g., 
Daniel  N.  Posner  2004a,  2004b).  Here  we 
have again  seen some progress  in measure-
ment. Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999) propose 
that  a  bimodal  distribution  of  preferences 
or  resources—“polarization”—is  linked 
to  greater  conflict  risk.  Jose  G.  Montalvo 
and  Marta  Reynal-Querol  (2005)  create 
an  empirical  measure  of  polarization  and 





ity  ethnic  rule—have  been  explored;  Lars-
Erik  Cederman  and  Luc  Girardin  (2007) 
find  that  minority   ethnic  rule  is  associated 
with  increased  risk  of  war,  although  once 
again this result may not be robust (Fearon, 
Kimuli Kasara, and Laitin 2007). 
Another  area  of  measurement  concern  is 
income  inequality.  Some  case  studies  sug-
gest  that  ‘horizontal’  inequality—inequality 
that coincides with ethnic or other politically 
salient  cleavages—is  a  particularly  impor-
tant driver of civil conflict  (Sambanis 2005; 
Frances  Stewart  2001).  Yet  more  work  is 









The  finding  that  many  civil  conflicts 
are  fought  partially  along  ethnic  lines 
alone  is  insufficient  to  make  the  case  that 
 ethnic-based grievances are driving the fight-
ing. An alternative explanation, for example, 
is  that  the  costs  of  organizing  a  rebellion 






highlight  the  susceptibility  of  states  with 
weak institutions to civil war. In particular, 
partly  democratic  societies  (called  anocra-
cies  in  political  science)  have  emerged  as 
prime  incubators  of  civil  conflict.  By  this 
argument,  violent  collective  action  occurs 
because dissidents are free enough to orga-
nize but nonviolent political activism is typi-
cally  ineffective  (Fearon  and  Laitin  2003; 
Hegre et al. 2001).
Yet  recent  work  suggests  such  findings 
must  be  taken  with  caution.  For  instance, 
democracy  and  anocracy  measures,  com-
monly  based  upon  the  Polity  IV  dataset 






findings  highlight  the  need  for  better  mea-
sures of state institutions and less reliance on 
existing data. The  importance of  goverence 
persists, however,  even after  accounting  for 
the endogenous coding of the Polity IV data. 
Goldstone et al. (2010) use conflict forecast-
ing  to  show  that  regime  type  is  among  the 
most  robust  predictors  of  civil  war  onset: 
regimes  with  restricted  competition  and 
some  repression  of  political  participation 






than  explanatory,  such  exercises  emphasize 
the  importance  of  investigating  the  institu-
tions–conflict link further.
Reviewing  the  case  literature,  Sambanis 
(2005)  suggests  several  possibilities  await-
ing  empirical  exploration:  considering  new 
versus  established  democracies  separately; 










Finally,  while  a  degree  of  measurement 
error  in  both  dependent  and  indepen-





 cross-country  work,  few  of  the  papers  we 
reviewed  weigh  its  consequences  on  their 
estimates.  The  implications  of  measure-
ment  error  ought  to  be  discussed  with  the 
same  attention  as  endogeneity  concerns. 
Fortunately,  instrumental  variables  estima-
tion  addresses  attenuation  bias  due  to  clas-
sical  measurement  error,  and  this  is  one 
promising way forward.
Integration with case studies. Historical-









evidence  we  have  for  the  rationalist  roots 





Virginia  Page  Fortna  (2004a,  2008)  exam-
ines  the  duration  of  peace  with  and  with-
out  peacekeepers  and  reaches  a  similar 
conclusion.  Both  recognize  the  limitations 
of  econometric  analysis  when  missions  are 
selective  and  heterogeneous.  Fortna  shows, 
however, how nearly all observable determi-
nants of peacekeeping interventions point to 
the  U.N.  selecting  the  hardest,  rather  than 
easiest, cases and thus if anything her analy-
sis  may  be  underestimating  peace-building 
effectiveness.
More  revealing,  however,  is  the  insight 
their  cases  bring  to  theories  of  conflict. 
Doyle  and  Sambanis,  and  Fortna,  conclude 
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asymmetries. Agreeing to a foreign interven-
tion, furthermore,  is a means for both sides 
to  credibly  signal  a  commitment  to  peace. 
If  keeping  the  peace  requires  that  external 
actors  resolve  information asymmetries and 
commitment  problems,  it  seems  likely  that 
their absence contributed to war in the first 
place.  The  evidence  is  far  from  conclusive, 
but  unlike  most  cross-country  regressions, 
these case-based studies specifically grapple 
with rationalist theories of war.
Multi-country  case  studies  are  also  gen-
erating  new  hypotheses  and  illuminating 
some  of  the  causal  dynamics  driving  civil 
conflict  (Cynthia  J.  Arnson  and  I.  William 
Zartman  2005;  e.g.,  Collier  and  Sambanis 
2005a,  2005b;  Fearon  and  Laitin  2005; 
Walter and Jack Snyder 1999). Generalizable 
or  not,  a  single  case  can  illustrate  possible 
causal  mechanisms,  generate  new  hypoth-
eses  for  testing,  and  stimulate  innovative 
data   collection.  While  this  case  literature 
is  diverse  and  impossible  to  summarize  in 
full,  a  number  of  influential  patterns  and 
mechanisms  stand  out,  including:  the  con-
flict-provoking  effects  of  commodity  price 
shocks  on  fragile  economies  (a  claim  with 
only  mixed  cross-country  empirical  back-
ing);  the  central  role  of  external  financing 
to  sustain  insurgencies  (including  providing 
cross-border territory for camps, markets for 
extracted  resources,  and  military  aid);  the 
pervasiveness of earlier state repression; per-










to  the  study  of  ethnic  conflict,  argues  for  federalism  as 
an  institutional  reform  that  changes  the  locus  of  politi-
cal conflict from the center to an increasingly large set of 
smaller conflicts in different federal states.
Beyond borders.  Another  promis-
ing  direction  is  investigating  civil  conflict 
causes  beyond  the  nation-state.  One  of  the 
more novel approaches  is  taken by Andreas 
Wimmer  and  Brian  Min  (2006),  who  use 
fixed  geographic  territories  as  the  unit  of 
analysis (rather than the more recent nation-
state) over  two centuries. They suggest  that 
the  likelihood  of  civil  and  interstate  wars 
has  been  highest  during  the  two  massive 
institutional  transformations  that  shaped 
the  modern  world:  the  nineteenth  century 
incorporation  of  most  of  Africa  and  Asia 
into  European  empires,  and  mid-twentieth 
century  formation  of  nation-states  in  those 










tor  of  armed  civil  conflict.  Kristian  Skrede 
Gleditsch  (2007)  finds  that  the  presence  of 
trans-boundary ethnic groups increases con-
flict risk, while having stronger democracies 
in  the  region  and  more  interregional  trade 
are both associated with less civil war. Idean 
Salehyan  and Gleditsch  (2006) provide evi-
dence  for  another  potential  source  of  con-
flict  contagion:  refugees. Refugee flows  can 
ease  arms  smuggling,  expand  rebel  social 
networks,  and  provide  a  new  pool  of  rebel 
recruits.  Looking  beyond  borders  may  also 
change our perspective on the role of ethnic 
“grievances.”  Diasporas,  whether  in  neigh-
boring countries or farther afield, driven by 
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conflicts  (including  the  role  of  foreign  aid, 
Cold  War  interventions,  and  cross-border 
raids)  highlights  an  important  limitation  of 
the existing theoretical work on armed con-
flict causes, namely its almost exclusive focus 
on  the  internal  armed  groups’  decision  of 
whether or not to fight. This is an important 
direction for future formal theoretical work, 
and  will  likely  draw  heavily  on  the  existing 
international relations literature.
Conflict duration and termination. 
Researchers  have  also  studied  war  dura-
tion and termination.38 For instance, Fearon 
(2004), proceeds inductively, sorting cases by 
length  and  looking  for  salient  patterns.  He 




political  control  of  the  central  government. 
Meanwhile,  autonomy-seeking  peripheral 
region  insurgencies  and  “sons-of-the-soil” 
movements  (fought  by  the  local  majority 
against in-migrants) tend to last much longer.
Researchers commonly use a proportional 
hazard  model  to  analyze  conflict  duration, 
employing  a  variety of  economic  and  social 
variables  to  assess  the  role  of  greed,  griev-
ance  and  other  factors  in  the  length  of 
civil  wars  (e.g.,  Collier,  Hoeffler,  and  Mans 
Soderbom  2004).  Others  have  introduced 
more  sophisticated  methods,  including 
competing  risk  models  (Karl  R.  de  Rouen 
and David Sobek 2004). One finding is that 
 ethnically  fragmented  and  polarized  coun-
tries  experience  longer  conflicts  (Sambanis 
and  Ibrahim  A.  Elbadawi  2000;  Reynal-
Querol  and  Montalvo  2007).  David  E. 
Cunningham (2006) finds  that  conflicts  are 
38  Roy  Licklider  (1993)  provides  an  influential  early 
collection of case studies.
longer where multiple groups (“veto players”) 
must  approve  a  settlement  because  there 
are  fewer  mutually  acceptable  agreements, 
information  asymmetries  are  more  acute, 
and  shifting  alliances  create  incentives  to 
hold out, complicating negotiations.
These  duration  analyses  have  been  use-
ful  but  suffer  from  many  of  the  same  chal-
lenges  as  the  onset  and  incidence  literature: 
divergent  results  using  different  datasets; 
endogenous explanatory variables; and heroic 
interpretations  of  proxy  variables.  Nonlinear 





A typology of conflict.  Researchers  have 
analyzed civil war as a single phenomenon by 
assumption,  leading  some  political  scientists 




gency,  and  the  long-running  insurgency  in 
Colombia all examples of the same phenom-
enon, or should we study them separately?
In  response,  several  papers  have  begun 
to  explore  new  civil  war  “typologies.”  Some 
have  segregated  wars  by  scale,  distinguish-
ing between “conflicts” of 25 to 1,000 battle 
deaths  per  year,  versus  “wars”  of  more  than 
1,000  battle  deaths  (Gleditsch,  et  al.  2002). 
Others, like Sambanis (2001), explore whether 
“identity” (i.e., ethnic and religious) wars have 
different  causes  than  ”nonidentity”  wars. 




ing  regular  armies  and  defined  front  lines); 
“symmetric nonconventional wars” with regu-
lar armies fighting peripheral or  rural  insur-
gencies;  “symmetric  irregular  wars,”  fought 
between  weak  national  armies  and  insur-
gents; and the least common, “urban wars.”
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Such subclassifications are difficult to test 










A  further  concern  is  that  a  generally 
accepted approach (and theoretical justifica-
tion)  for  subclassification will prove elusive; 
the  type  of  civil  conflict  that  occurs—for 
instance, a center-seeking versus autonomy-
seeking civil conflict—is endogenous to state 




Cramer  (2007)  challenges  civil  war 
scholars  further,  asking  why  civil  wars  are 
 analyzed as phenomena distinct  from other 
forms of political violence—communal riots, 
state  massacres,  and  coups  d’état.  Neither 
the  theoretical nor empirical case has been 
settled  for  how  to  most  usefully  classify 
political  violence  into  different  categories. 
Moreover, the lines between wars, conflicts, 
coups and communal violence are sometimes 
ambiguous,  potentially  leading  to  errors  of 
measurement.  Exploring  these  categorical 
assumptions is an interesting area for future 
analysis,  one  that  could  soon  be  more  con-
vincingly  tackled  with  new  data  on  non-
state  armed  conflicts  and  “one-sided”  state 





    The  Uppsala  Conflict  Data  Program  (UCDP) 
defines  non-state  armed  conflict  as  the  use  of  armed 
force  between  two  organized  groups,  neither  of 
which  is  the  government  of  a  state,  which  results  in 
at  least  twenty-five  battle-related  deaths  in  a  year. 
3.1.2  Further Challenges and Paths Ahead  
 for Cross-Country Empirical Work
Despite  the  empirical  difficulties,  we  do 
not  believe  that  the  cross-country  regres-
sion  should  be  abandoned  entirely.  But  the 
path  forward  looks  different  than  the  one 
already  traveled.  Existing  empirical  models 
are too rarely rooted in formal economic the-
ories of conflict, regression functional forms 
are  too  often  ad  hoc,  the  selection  of  prox-
ies  is driven by  the variables easily  at hand 
(or  online),  and  their  inclusion  justified  by 
informal arguments. As noted above, there is 
good reason to believe that the relationships 
between  civil  conflict  and  income  shocks, 






As  this  literature  continues  to  advance, 
there are a handful of best practices to main-





risk  factors  and  triggers,  including  better 
measures  of  political  grievance  and  pov-
erty  among  key  population  subgroups,  and 
various  dimensions  of  state  institutions  and 
capacity. Fourth, where measurement  error 
persists, explicit attention to its ramifications.
Although  deriving  policy  implications  is 
not  the  main  goal  of  this  survey,  there  are 
some  implications  of  this  literature  worth 
speculating  about.  The  empirical  relation-
ship  between  violence  and  low  and  falling 
They  define  one-sided  violence  as  the  use  of  armed 
force  by  the  government  or  by  a  formally  organized 
group against civilians which results in at least twenty-
five  deaths  in  a  year,  excluding  extrajudicial  killings 
(UCDP 2008).
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incomes found in the cross-country literature 
suggests  that  implementing  insurance 
schemes  to  protect  poor  societies  from 
negative  income shocks could be  fruitful  in 
reducing the risk of civil conflict. A number 
of  authors  have  recently  proposed  reforms 
to  the design of  foreign aid and  to national 
agricultural policies  to help blunt aggregate 
income  shocks  and  thus  help  avoid  future 
rounds  of  bloodshed  (Collier  and  Hoeffler 
2002).  One  possibility  is  expanded  regional 
drought  insurance  for  farmers.  A  variant  is 
foreign  aid  contingent  on  objective  conflict 
risk  indicators  (e.g., weather)—what Miguel 





prevent  civil  war.  Yet  while  we  observe  a 
poverty–conflict  link  in  the  data,  too  little 
is  known  about  the  precise  identity  of  the 






leaders  would  be  more  cost-effective  than 
efforts to target the pocketbooks of potential 




emerging  applied  microeconomic  research 
on civil war.
3.2  Micro-Level Empirical Evidence on the 
Causes of Civil War
The analysis of household and regional data 
is a growing, and perhaps the most promis-




geography  in  influencing  where  and  when 
civil conflicts are fought; and (iii) the organi-
zation and conduct of conflict. 
3.2.1  The Decision to Rebel
Individuals are the natural unit of analy-
sis  for  understanding  how  armed  groups 
mobilize  civilians  to  fight  and  contribute 
resources  to  their  cause.  The  black  box 
assumptions  made  in  theoretical  models 
on group cohesion and origins need better 
justification.  In  response,  the  issue  of  col-
lective  action  is  the  subject  of  a  growing 
empirical literature. 
The largest body of evidence comes from 
case  studies  of  twentieth  century  rebel-
lions. Several offer evidence consistent with 
models  of  self-interested  actors  seeking  to 
maximize  material  payoffs.  For  example, 
Mark  Irving  Lichbach  (1994;  1995)  illus-
trates  how  successful  social  movements 
offer selective material incentives to joiners. 
Samuel  L.  Popkin  (1979;  1988)  finds  that 
political  entrepreneurs  developed  mecha-
nisms  to  directly  reward  peasant  rebellion 
in  Vietnam.  Weinstein  (2007)  illustrates 
40  Targeting this aid toward the social groups most likely 






in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  Several  African  countries,  most 
notably Botswana, have already successfully implemented 
similar  national  drought   insurance  programs  including 
public works employment, and these could serve as models 
(Theodore  R.  Valentine  1993);  Mick  Moore  and  Vishal 
Jadhav  (2006)  discuss  a  related  large-scale  rural  public 
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how  in  Mozambique,  Sierra  Leone,  and 
Peru  rebel  fighters  were  remunerated  via 
looting of civilian property and drug sales. 
Material  incentives may also be non-pecu-
niary.  Where  violence  against  civilians  is 
commonplace,  joining  an  armed  group 
has  in  many  cases  been  a  path  to  relative 
safety (Jeffrey Goodwin 2006; Kalyvas and 
Matthew  Kocher  2007;  Lichbach  1995;  T. 
David Mason and Dale A. Krane 1989). The 













ent.41  Another  literature  documents  how 
ethnic  and  social  identities  have  been  used 
to  identify, reward, and sanction free-riders, 
thereby  providing  selective  social  incentives 
to  participate  (Moore  1993;  Elinor  Ostrom 
1990; Petersen 2001; Weinstein 2007).
A  small  but  growing  number  of  recent 
papers  employ  within-country  regional  data 
to explore the factors that predict violence and 
rebellion,  and  most  find  strong  associations 
with local economic conditions. In Indonesia, 
Patrick  Barron,  Kai  Kaiser  and  Menno 
Pradhan  (2004)  find  positive  correlations 
between  village-level  communal  violence 
41  Some recent work on terrorism reaches similar con-
clusions.  Alan  B.  Krueger  and  Jitka  Maleckova  (2003) 
claim terrorists’ primary motive is passionate support for 




ing  to  the positive selection of  terrorists documented by 
Krueger and Maleckova.
and  local unemployment,  economic  inequal-
ity and natural disasters. Using data gathered 






civil  war  deaths  and  low  living  standards. 
Using the same conflict outcome measure in 
seventy-five Nepalese districts, Quy-Toan Do 
and  Lakshmi  Iyer  (2007)  find  that  conflict 
intensity  is  strongly  and  positively  related  to 
the  presence  of  mountainous  and  forested 








These  studies  are  informative  and  pio-
neering but many  suffer  from challenges of 




Western,  English-language  news  reports. 
Moreover,  individual  motivations  and  deci-
sions are difficult to infer from district-level 
aggregate  data;  just  as  in  the  cross-country 
literature,  there  is  too  often  a  tendency  to 
make  deep  behavioral  claims  from  simple 
cross-sectional  correlations.  The  location 
of fighting might also reflect armed groups’ 
strategic  considerations  (i.e.,  the  location 
of  important  government  military  targets) 
42 One  of  the  drawbacks  to  reviewing  a  burgeoning 
literature is that it is sometimes difficult for the outsider 
(and  reviewer)  to  readily  reconcile  contrasting  results 
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rather  than  the  underlying  socioeconomic 
conditions  in  those  areas.  Finally,  there 
remains  the  possibility  of  reverse  causality; 
for example, in a single cross-section, conflict 
could contribute to poverty directly, as well 
as  be  driven  by  poverty  itself.  Even  panel 
data is not immune to these concerns, due to 
the economic changes driven by anticipated 
future  conflict  or  other  omitted  variables. 
Nevertheless,  the  subnational  approach  is  a 
useful step forward.
A  recent  study  by  Oeindrila  Dube  and 
Juan  F.  Vargas  (2008)  overcomes  some  of 
these  concerns,  employing  exogenous  price 
shocks and detailed panel data on civil vio-
lence—guerilla  and  paramilitary  attacks, 
clashes with government military, and civil-
ian  casualties—across  over  one  thousand 
Colombian  municipalities.  Consistent  with 
their  theoretical  model  (which  builds  on 
Dal  Bó  and  Dal  Bó  2004),  they  find  that 
an  increase  in  the  international  price  of 
Colombia’s  leading  labor-intensive  export 
commodity,  coffee,  significantly  reduces 
violence  in  coffee-producing  regions,  while 
an  increase  in  the  international  price  of  an 
important  capital-intensive  export  good, 
petroleum, increases violence in regions with 
oil  reserves  and  pipelines.  In  an  important 
validation  of  their  theoretical  model,  they 
then  use  rural  household  surveys  to  show 
that  the  positive  coffee  shock  affects  labor 
market  outcomes  in  the  hypothesized  way, 
boosting rural incomes and thus presumably 
raising the opportunity cost of participating 
in  rebellion.  A  limitation  of  the  study  is  its 
lack of data on actual individual recruitment 
into rebel groups or paramilitaries.
To  the  extent  the  patterns  observed  in 
Indonesia,  Nepal  and  especially  Colombia 
are  causal,  the  most  likely  interpreta-
tion  is  that  higher  individual  opportunity 
costs  lower  the  probability  of  participa-
tion  in armed groups. We are hopeful  that 
increased  use  of  innovative  micro  datasets 
will yield a more complete view of the pov-
erty–conflict   relationship  and  clarify  the 
exact  mechanisms.43 For instance, it remains 
unclear empirically whether it is usually the 
poorest  who  actually  fight  in  rebel  groups, 
and  none  of  these  studies  tells  us  by  what 
means  collective  action  problems  are  over-
come in forming and running armed groups.
A  handful  of  individual-  and  household-




cultural  survey  sample.  He  finds  that  both 
poor wage workers and land renters were dis-
proportionately represented among genocide 
perpetrators,  and  that  they  appear  to  have 
been  motivated  by  interest  in  the  property 
of  landlords  (who  were  disproportionately 
victims),  suggesting  a  class-based  interpre-
tation.44  In  Sierra  Leone,  Humphreys  and 
Weinstein  (2008)  collect  post-war  data  on 





armed  groups.  However,  proxies  for  politi-
cal  exclusion,  such  as  supporting  a  national 
opposition  political  party,  did  not  predict 
participation.  Unexpectedly,  they  also  find 
that the empirical determinants of voluntary 
and  forcible  recruitment  were  similar,  sug-
gesting that rebel  leaders might be employ-
ing selective rewards and punishments stra-
tegically. Alternatively,  it  could point  to  the 
limitations  of  postwar  self-reported  data 
on  the  rebel  participation  decision,  since 
respondents  have  strong  incentives  to  lie 
about  the  nature  of  their  recruitment  and 
43  For  example,  Justino  (2009)  surveys  the  emerging 
micro-level evidence and suggests that household poverty 
interacts  with  vulnerability  (or  risk  of  exposure)  to  vio-
lence in complex ways.
44 Catherine  André  and  Jean-Philippe  Platteau 
(1998) find related results. See also Straus (2006) on the 
Rwandan Genocide.







in  genocide—supposedly  the  quintessential 
act of  irrational hatred. Proxies  for political 
grievances  perform  far  more  poorly  at  pre-
dicting  individual  behavior  than  economic 
factors in these cases. Existing data on politi-




decisive  determinants  of  participation  in 
armed groups. We again return to the need 










offered  by  armed  organizations.  A  robust 
assessment  of  competing  explanations  for 
rebel  recruitment  would  require  data  on 
the  individual  characteristics  of  rebel  par-
ticipants  and  non-participants,  as  well  as 
the  recruitment  “offers”  received  by  both 
types  of  individuals,  both  offers  taken  and 
those  refused. These data will obviously be 
extremely  challenging  to  collect,  especially 
retrospective data given the high and selec-
tive  mortality  experienced  during  wartime, 
and  will  likely  require  greater   coordination 
between  researchers,  governments  and 
humanitarian aid donors.
3.2.2  Internal Geography
Like  recruitment,  geographic  patterns  of 
conflict within states are best explored using 
sub-national  data.  To  this  end,  researchers 
in organizations like the International Peace 
Research  Institute  of  Oslo  (PRIO)  and  the 




on  the  role  of  geography.  Halvard  Buhaug 
and Jan Ketil Rød (2006),  for  instance, dis-
aggregate  conflict  and  geographic  country 
data  into  100  kilometer  by  100  kilometer 
grids within Africa, and find that separatist 
conflicts are more likely to occur in sparsely 
populated  regions  near  national  borders,  at 




secessionists  are  presumably  highest.45  The 




doms  containing  greater  diamond  wealth 
(John Bellows and Miguel 2009).  Joshua D. 
Angrist and Adriana D. Kugler (2008) simi-















to  fought  in  the  peripheries.  Larger  conflict  zones  are 
associated  with  border  zones,  the  presence  of  natural 
resources,  and  peripheral  conflicts.  While  interesting,  it 
remains  to  be  seen  what  such  associations  can  add  to  a 
theoretical understanding of civil war.
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nization  and  action,  however,  has  lagged 
behind.  Economists  and  political  scien-
tists  have  begun  to  conduct  surveys  of  ex-
combatants  in  Burundi,  Colombia,  Liberia, 
Sierra  Leone,  and  Uganda  (Jeannie  Annan 
et  al.  2008;  Ana  M.  Arjona  and  Kalyvas 
2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; Eric 
Mvukiyehe,  Cyrus  Samii,  and  Gwendolyn 





motivations  for  joining  an  armed  group  or 
committing particular acts of war.
Such data have limitations, however: they 
are  self-reported;  they are based on a  sam-
ple of survivors; and they can seldom move 
beyond  descriptive  analysis  of  who  joins 
and  why.  Isolating  exogenous  variation  in 
recruitment, tactics, or exposure to violence 
is  crucial  for  drawing  firm  conclusions.  For 
instance, to understand the determinants of 
civilian  abuse,  Humphreys  and  Weinstein 
(2006)  construct  military  unit-level  mea-
sures  of  discipline  and  civilian  abusiveness 
that are exogenous to the individual respon-
dent. However, the sample size is such that, 
unfortunately,  there  are  seldom  more  than 
one or two observations per unit. Beber and 
Blattman (2008) use new data on  combatants, 
and  exogenous  constraints  on  rebel  recruit-
ment,  to  understand  the  logic  of  coercive 
child  recruitment  in  northern  Uganda. 
Unpopular  and  short  of  funds,  the  rebel 
Lord’s Resistance Army had just one means 
of  gaining  recruits:  abduction,  followed  by 
the  constant  threat  of  punishment  against 
46    For  case  studies  on  African  guerrilla  movements, 
see Christopher S. Clapham (1998) and Morten Bøås and 
Kevin C. Dunn (2007).
new  recruits.  The  likelihood  of  receiving  a 
firearm and self-reported dependability was 
increasing  in  age,  while  loyalty  and  length 
of stay fall in age. From a rebel perspective, 
the  intermediate  age group—young  adoles-




against  civilians  may  be  another  source  of 
exogenous  variation.  Kalyvas  (2006)  docu-
ments  100  studies  and  45  historical  cases 
where state violence against noncombatants 
provoked  greater  insurgent  violence  as  a 
response. In a recent micro-empirical study, 
Jason  Lyall  (2009a)  examines  the  effect  of 












in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  Military  analysts 
and  commanders  have  written  extensively 
on  theories  and  lessons  learned  in  the field 
(e.g.,  Richard  L.  Clutterbuck  1966;  David 
Galula 1964; H. R. McMaster 2008; John A. 
Nagl  2002; David  H. Petraeus  2006; Kalev 
I. Sepp 2005).48 Researchers have begun to 
investigate the efficacy of recent U.S. coun-
terinsurgency  operations.  Berman,  Shapiro 
and  Joseph  H.  Felter  (2008)  find  that  the 
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disbursement  of  small-scale  reconstruction 
funds by U.S. field military commanders  in 
Iraq is correlated with lower levels of insur-
gent  attacks.  Of  course,  selection  on  unob-
served  traits,  or  regression  to  the  mean, 
could be driving this apparent effect; for this 
reason, a number of experimental and quasi-
experimental  evaluations  of  counter-insur-
gency spending are presently underway.49
Some recent work finds that armed groups 
respond  strategically  to  new  information. 
Radha Iyengar and Jonathan Monten (2008) 
develop data on insurgent attacks and media 
coverage  in  Iraq,  and  find  an  “embolden-
ment” effect of new  information about U.S. 




trate  the  existence  of  asymmetric  informa-
tion between the warring parties. This work 
advances our understanding of the empirical 





necessary  datasets  are  expensive,  hard-won, 
and often require a mix of luck and ingenuity. 
Hence they are too few in number. Second, 
sufficient  attention  has  often  not  been  paid 
to  measurement  issues,  research  design, 
and  econometric  identification.  Too  many 
researchers  have  rushed  to  collect  micro-
data without adequately preparing a research 
design  in  advance,  or  testing  the  assump-
tions required for causal  inference. Third,  it 
remains to be seen whether and how micro-
level  results  will  test  conflict  theories.  In 
49 Of note is  the U.S. Defense Department’s Minerva 
Research  Initiative,  which  in  cooperation  with  a  con-
sortium of university  researchers,  is  supporting  rigorous 
impact  evaluations  of  development  and    military  pro-
grams to build peace in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, 
Philippines, and elsewhere (Princeton University 2009). 
particular,  while  counter-insurgency  studies 
have inherent military value, it is not always 
clear  how  they  relate  to  broader  theoretical 
debates.  Fourth,  it  remains  to  be  seen  how 
micro-level  insights  from  one  war  general-





4.  Economic Legacies of Civil Conflict
People living in zones of war are maimed, 
killed,  and  see  their  property  destroyed. 




 poverty,  wealth,  health,  and  education.50 
Each  of  these  outcomes  has  implications 
beyond the individual, however. To the extent 
that  these  costs  are borne unequally  across 
groups,  conflict  could  intensify  economic 
inequality as well as poverty. The destruction 
(and deferred accumulation) of both human 
and  physical  capital  also  hinder  macroeco-
nomic  performance,  combining  with  any 
effects of war on institutions and technology 
to impact national income growth. 
Understanding  the  economic  legacies  of 
conflict  is  also  important  to  the  design  of 
postconflict  recovery.  If  war  itself  further 




Indeed,  the  aggregate  effects  of  armed 
conflict,  and  its  threat,  are  considerable. 
Dani  Rodrik  (1999)  argues  that  outbreaks 
of  social  conflict  are  a  primary  reason  why 
50  Justino  (2007,  2009)  also  surveys  this  emerging 
literature. Many of  the datasets  and working papers  are 
being shared via research groups such as the Households 
in Conflict Network (http://www.hicn.org).
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national  economic  growth  rates  lack  per-
sistence  and  why  so  many  countries  have 
experienced a growth collapse since the mid-
1970s.  A  number  of  cross-country  growth 
studies  link measures of political  instability 
to large negative effects on national savings, 
investment,  income  and  growth.51  Valerie 
Cerra and Sweta Chaman Saxena (2008) find 
that output declines six percent in the imme-
diate  aftermath  of  a  civil  war.  Quantitative 
case  evidence  supports  this  cross-country 
relationship:  Alberto  Abadie  and  Javier 
Gardeazabal  (2003)  find  that  terrorist  vio-
lence in the Basque region of Spain has sig-
nificantly  reduced  economic  growth  there 
relative to neighboring regions. The effect on 
poverty can be dramatic. In Rwanda, 20 per-
cent  of  the  population  moved  into  poverty 
following the genocide (Justino and Verwimp 
2006).  Civil  wars  may  also  have  negative 
growth  spillovers  on  neighboring  countries 
(James C. Murdoch and Sandler 2004).
An  economic  growth  theory  framework 
is  useful  for  analyzing  the  consequences  of 
conflict. If conflict affects economic perfor-
mance,  it  must  be  because  it  affects  a  fac-
tor of production  (physical  capital,  labor, or 
human capital),  the technology,  institutions, 
and  culture  that  augment  these  factors,  or 
prices  (e.g.,  costs  of  capital).  The  growth 
framework also clarifies  the possible nature 
of  the  impacts,  not  only  on  income  levels 
and  economic  growth  in  equilibrium,  but 
also out-of-equilibrium dynamics such as the 
speed of convergence.
The  framework  we  use  to  organize  our 
discussion  is  based  on  neoclassical  mod-
els  of  growth  with  human  capital  (e.g., 
Robert E. Lucas 1988; N. Gregory Mankiw, 
David  Romer,  and  David  N.  Weil  1992). 
51  See  Robert  J.  Barro  (1991),  Alesina  et  al.  (1996), 
Alesina  and  Perotti  (1996),  and  Svensson  (1998).  The 






the  likely  impact  of  violence—and,  in  par-
ticular,  the  destruction  of  capital—on  eco-
nomic performance. To illustrate, a one-time 
shock to capital has no effect on equilibrium 







capital  destruction  also  matters:  recovery 
could  be  faster  under  highly  asymmetric 
destruction—say,  extensive  physical  capital 
destruction  when  human  capital  remains 
largely intact—since the relative abundance 
of  one  type  of  capital  raises  the  marginal 
product  of  the  scarce  type,  spurring  on 
investment.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003, 
p. 246) describe this “imbalance effect” in a 
one-sector  endogenous  growth  model  with 
physical and human capital, with the follow-
ing production function:
(4)    Y = AK α(Lh)1−α,
where  A,  K,  and  L  have  the  usual  inter-
pretations  as  technology,  physical  capital, 
and  workers,  respectively,  h  denotes  aver-
age worker human capital, and total human 
capital  is  H =  Lh.  They  examine  the  case 
where the K/H ratio deviates from its steady 
state value of α/(1 − α), for instance due to 
war  damage;  capital  investments  are  irre-
versible;  and  there  are  adjustment  costs  to 
 capital  accumulation.  When  adjustments 




results  in  slower  economic  growth  and 
recovery  than  the  destruction  of  physical 
capital, during the transition back to steady 
state growth.
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Given  the  proliferation  of  plausible  theo-
retical  perspectives,  empirical  evidence  is 
essential. Yet assessing the economic conse-
quences of civil war is complicated by a central 






direct  impacts  of  war.  Similar  endogene-
ity  concerns  arise  in  assessing  impacts  on 
government  performance  and  institutions, 











4.1  Physical Capital and Investment
Evidence  from  interstate  wars  suggests 
that  the  postwar  evolution  of  physical 
capital  often  behaves  as  predicted  by  the 
neoclassical  model,  namely,  rapid  recov-
ery  to  equilibrium  levels.  One  set  of  stud-
ies  examines  the  impact  of  U.S.  bombing 
on  later  outcomes  at  the  city  or  regional 
level. Although they generally lack detailed 
information  on  local  physical  capital  lev-
els,  in  Japan  (Donald  R.  Davis  and  David 
E.  Weinstein  2002)  and  Germany  (Steven 
Brakman,  Harry  Garretsen,  and  Marc 
Schramm  2004)  in  World  War  II,  cities 
that  were  heavily  bombed  quickly  recover 
in  population  back  to  prewar  trends,  such 
that 20 to 25 years postwar city populations 






These  cross-region  results  echo  the  con-
sensus  from  the  cross-country  literature  on 
the rapid recovery of postwar economies (A. 
F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler 1977, 1980; 
Adam  Przeworski  et  al.  2000).  Indeed,  a 
recent study of the output response to alter-
native  crises—including  currency  crises, 
banking crises, civil war, and sudden shifts in 
executive power—finds that while civil wars 










trap  models  of  economic  growth  such  as 
those recently advanced by Jeffrey D. Sachs 
(2005).
Nevertheless,  there  are  reasons  to  be 
cautious  in  generalizing  these  experiences. 
These  studies  cannot  rule  out  the  possibil-
ity  that  the  economic  devastation  caused 
by  civil  war  prevent  some  countries  from 
achieving durable peace. Countries with suc-
cessful postwar  economic  recovery  are  also 
more  likely  to  collect  systematic  economic 
data,  introducing  possible  selection  bias: 
war-torn  countries  where  the  economy  and 
institutions  have  collapsed  (e.g.,  Congo  and 
Somalia)  lack  good  data,  while  those  that 
recover  (Vietnam)  have  data.  This  could 






caused  by  bombing,  creating  some  separa-
tion between the evidence we have and the 
contexts of greatest interest.
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Yet  even  in  civil  conflicts  without  large-
scale  bombing,  capital  can  sometimes  be 
depleted  in  devastating  ways.  First,  house-
hold  assets  may  be  stolen  or  destroyed. 
Mozambicans,  for  instance,  are  thought 
to have  lost 80 percent of  their  cattle  stock 
during their civil war (Tilman Bruck 1996), 
while  many  in  northern  Uganda  lost  all 
of  their  cattle,  homes  and  assets  (Annan, 
Blattman,  and  Roger  Horton  2006;  Robert 
Gersony 1997); cattle and other farm assets 
often  represent  most  of  a  rural  household’s 
savings. As of yet, however, there is still lim-
ited  systematic  panel  data  on  the  implica-
tions of such asset loss on long-run household 
welfare. Second,  countries  at war  are  likely 
to see massive flight of mobile forms of capi-
tal, since foreign assets offer higher relative 





The  neoclassical  growth  model  predic-
tion  that  the  capital  stock  should  return 
to  its  steady  state  level  once  the  fighting 
stops—implying  relatively  high  returns 
and  rates  of  investment  that  decline  as  the 
equilibrium  is  approached—supposes  that 
underlying   institutions  and  technology  are 
largely  unaffected  by  the  fighting,  and  that 
military  spending,  the  returns  to  capital 
investment  and  the  cost  of  capital  similarly 
return  to prewar  levels. Yet  any political  or 
economic uncertainty following war is likely 
to decrease expected returns,  increase rela-
tive  risk,  and  possibly  shorten  investment 
52  Rising military spending can also crowd out govern-
ment  infrastructure  projects  and  other  public  goods.  A 
World Bank report estimates that average military spend-


















(Collier  2007).  Collier  and  Hoeffler  (2002) 
suggest  that  increased  foreign  aid  is  likely 
to  reduce  civil  conflict  risk,  and  find  some 
modest  reductions  in  the  likelihood of con-
flict  for aid  recipients, working  through  the 
channel  of  faster  economic growth. Yet  the 
nonrandom placement of both civil conflicts 













Future  advances  could  come  from  disag-






military  interventions. Such  calculations  are 
53 An emerging literature examines the role that post-
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highly dependent on parameters for which we 
currently have limited data (e.g., the growth 
effects  of  avoiding  a  civil  war,  the  selection 
of countries into different interventions) and 
thus have to be interpreted with caution.
4.2  Life, Labor, and Human Capital
Wars kill and maim people, both directly 
and  indirectly  through  famine  and  disease. 
Conflict  victims  are  overwhelmingly  civil-
ians, and indirect deaths are seen dispropor-




the  economic  effects  on  human  capital  and 
quality of life persist. In the study of Vietnam 
bombing mentioned above,  local  living  stan-
dards and human capital levels also converged 




showing  rapid  post-war  economic  recovery 
and argues against poverty trap type models. 
An  innovation  is  the  attempt  to  address  the 
endogeneity of bombing. Miguel and Roland 
instrument  for  bombing  intensity  using  dis-
tance from the arbitrarily settled North-South 
Vietnamese border (on the 17 th parallel north 
latitude).55  A  limitation  of  this  paper—and 
others  that  examine  differences  across  sub-






54 Wars  are  thought  to  have  directly  caused  269,000 
deaths  and  8.44  million  disability-adjusted  life-years 
(DALYs)  in 1999 alone, with twice again this number of 





impacts  on  individual  human  capital,  espe-
cially  in  African  cases.  Using  panel  data 
on  child  nutrition,  Harold  Alderman,  John 
Hoddinott  and  Bill  Kinsey  (2006)  find  that 
young  children  who  suffered  from  war-
related  malnutrition  in  Zimbabwe  are  sig-
nificantly  shorter  as  adults,  which  may 
affect  their  lifetime  labor productivity.  In a 
related  paper,  Tom  Bundervoet,  Verwimp, 
and  Richard  Akresh  (2009)  exploit  varia-
tion  in  the  timing  of  armed  clashes  in  the 
Burundi  civil  war  to  estimate  impacts  on 
child  nutrition,  and  find  that  children  who 
lived  in  a  war-affected  region  have  sharply 
lower  height-for-age  than  other  children, 
with an average drop of roughly 0.5  standard 
deviations.  Turning  to  a  Central  Asian  set-
ting,  adolescent  Tajik  girls  whose  homes 
were destroyed during that civil war are less 
likely  to  obtain  secondary  education,  again 
with  likely  adverse  effects  on  later  wages 





peaceful  regions  of  these  countries,  some-
thing  that  is  challenging  to  convincingly 
establish  with  the  limited  time  horizons  of 
most datasets.56 Moreover, as in the  bombing 
studies,  these  studies  may  underestimate 
war’s overall impacts to the extent that even 
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and  higher  mortality  (Angrist  1990,  1998; 
Angrist and Krueger 1994; Norman Hearst, 
Thomas B. Newman, and Stephen B. Hulley 






near-random  forced  recruitment  in  rural 
Uganda—to  estimate  its  impact  on  adoles-
cents and young adults. These conscripts are 
more likely to have persistent injuries, accu-
mulate  less  schooling  and  work  experience, 
are less likely to be engaged in skilled work, 
and  earn  lower  wages  as  adults  (especially 
males).  Psychological  trauma  and  commu-
nity  rejection, meanwhile,  are concentrated 
in  the  small  minority  that  experienced  the 
most violence.57 The conclusion that emerges 









and  society.  More  evidence  is  required  on 
the  educational,  employment,  and  health 
impacts of conflict on armed group partici-
pants and civilians,  including internally dis-
placed  people.  The  leading  question  is  not 
whether wars harm human capital stocks, but 
rather  in  what  ways,  how  much,  for  whom, 




57 A  somewhat  different  pattern  is  observed  by 
Humphreys  and  Weinstein  (2006,  2007),  who  find  that 





of programs are most  effective  at  overcom-
ing war’s adverse legacies on human capital.58
4.3  War, Institutions, and Society
The  steady  state  to  which  a  postconflict 
society returns is a function of the fundamen-
tal determinants of growth: technology, insti-
tutions,  and  social  organization.  The  rapid 
return to prewar levels of labor and capital in 
Germany,  Japan,  and  Vietnam  noted  above 
suggests  that  these  determinants  were  not 
diminished by war (or, if they were, they like-
wise recuperated quickly).
Unfortunately,  we  have  little  systematic 
quantitative  data  with  which  to  rigorously 
judge claims about the evolution of institu-
tions during and after civil wars. A  sizable 
literature  has  sought  to  identify  the  spe-
cific  institutional  factors  that  matter  most 
for  economic  growth—including  property 
rights  (Acemoglu,  Simon  Johnson,  and 
Robinson 2001), social capital and cohesion 
(Stephen  Knack  and  Philip  Keefer  1997), 
rational  bureaucracies,  and  work  ethics,  to 
name a few—but which of these are affected 
by civil war (not to mention how much and 
under what  circumstances)  remains  a mat-
ter  of  speculation.  The  social  and  institu-
tional  legacies  of  conflict  are  arguably  the 
most  important but  least understood of  all 
war impacts.
58 Other potentially important topics awaiting system-
atic  empirical  analysis  include:  the  role  of  war-related 
emigration  (especially  of  the  skilled)  on  later  economic 
growth,  the  general  equilibrium  effects  of  death  and 





impacts.  To  the  extent  that  the  sudden  death  of  sizable 
shares  of  the  working  age  adult  population  affects  rela-
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The historical evidence (described above) 
that war enables the development of capable 
government  institutions  in  Europe  may  not 
generalize  to  civil  war  cases.  In  the  three 
countries  that  experienced  U.S.  bombing, 
the  wars  were  fought  against  (largely)  for-
eign  armies,  and  hence  could  rally  citizens 
and renew government motivation and legiti-
macy.  In  civil  war,  government  may  lose 






tutions.  The  effort  to  control  the  nation’s 
peripheries,  and  the  extension  of  national 
control  down  to  the  community  level  are 
essential  state  responsibilities.  Successful 
states  do  so  through  a  variety  of  means, 
including  the  use  of  force  (Tilly  1982; 
Max Weber 1965). Hence  internal warfare 
could  hypothetically  generate  state-build-
ing  rather  than  institutional  disintegra-
tion.  Yoweri  Museveni’s  violent  takeover 
of  the  Ugandan  state,  for  instance,  hinged 
in  part  on  his  ability  to  organize  citizen 
councils from the village up to the national 
level—councils  that  became  the  basis  for 
postwar  administration  and  (especially  by 
regional standards) a relatively strong state 
(Weinstein 2005a)
Indeed,  there  is  some cross-country evi-
dence  that  wars  that  end  in  outright  mili-
tary  victory  for  one  fighting  side  lead  to  a 
more  stable  peace  and  possibly  stronger 
state  institutions  (Fortna  2004b;  Monica 
Duffy Toft 2008),  although once again  the 
omitted  variables  correlated  with  outright 
military  victories  make  interpretation  of 
this  pattern  difficult.  A  draw,  a  negotiated 
agreement,  or  a  ceasefire  is,  by  this  logic, 
an  unstable  equilibrium  bound  to  unravel. 
This  belief  has  led  some  scholars  to  argue 




recent  case  study  and  statistical  analysis 
indicates that aggressive peacekeeping leads 
to more lasting peace (Fortna 2008; Human 
Security  Report  Project  2008;  Sambanis 
2007).  Easterly  (2008)  argues  against  this 















to  focus  on  patterns  of  institutional  change 
during  and  postconflict.  While  the  analysis 
of  these relationships  is clearly  full of omit-
ted  variable  bias  concerns,  the  search  for 
innovative research designs should continue. 
Beber  (2008),  for  instance,  uses  the  higher 
likelihood of mediated bargaining occurring 
during  the  summer  months  (when  foreign 
politicians and diplomats are freer to broker 





tion  and  accountability.  Of  the  preliminary 
data available, some of the results are quite 
counterintuitive,  especially  an  apparent 
causal  link  between  war  violence  and  pro-
ductive citizenship postwar. A recent micro-
study finds  that war  victimization  increases 
later  individual  political  mobilization  and 
59  The  literature  on  war  termination  in  particular  is 
vast, and is outside the scope of this review.
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participation  in  local  collective  action  in 
Sierra  Leone,  which  the  authors  interpret 
as  a  result  of  the  psychological  legacies  of 
individual  violence  exposure  (Bellows  and 
Miguel  2006,  2009).  Former  combatants 
in  Uganda  were  also  more  likely  to  vote 
and  become  local  leaders  (Blattman  2009). 
Likewise, psychologists find that the victims 
of  violence  are  in  general  resilient  (Ann  S. 
Masten 2001), and that exposure has even led 
to  greater  political  activism  among  groups 
such as Jewish Holocaust survivors (Devora 





institutions,  and  social  norms  that  promote 
local  level  collective  action  are  necessarily 
harmed by civil war.60 
4.4  Remaining Challenges
Viewed  through  the  lens  of  economic 
growth models, the existing empirical liter-
ature on civil war impacts still looks spotty. 
Macroeconomic  studies  indicate  that  the 
short-run  output  effects  of  armed  conflict 
can  be  large,  but  more  work  is  needed  to 
examine  the  underlying  effects  on  factors 
of production and relative prices. The early 
signs  suggest  that  population  and  physical 
capital can fully recover after war, perhaps 
as  quickly  as  within  two  decades.  That 
recovery, however, appears to be contingent 
on  the  preservation,  or  even  the  improve-
ment,  of political  stability  and  institutions, 
as  was  the  case  in  Japan,  Germany,  and 
Vietnam. Yet what  the key  institutions are, 
and  which  domestic  policies  and  external 
60  Yet findings are far from uniform. Miguel, Sebastian 




violent  yellow  and  red  card  fouls  (conditional  on  player 
characteristics).
interventions  can  help  maintain  their  sta-
bility,  are  still  poorly  understood.  Even 









persistent  injuries,  lose  out  on  education, 
and  see  a  permanent  decline  in  their  pro-
ductivity  and  earnings.  But  understanding 






policymakers  and  foreign  aid  donors  have 
often  taken  a  scattershot  approach  to  post-
war  programs.  The  subject  of  post-conflict 
recovery policy is vast and is largely outside 
the scope of this review, but most of that lit-
erature comes  in  the  form of best practices 
summaries,  case  studies,  and  other  litera-
ture produced by international aid organiza-
tions,  governments,  and  NGOs.  Academic 
research remains limited, and where it exists, 
tends  to  focus  on  high-level  analysis  (e.g., 
the  relationship  between  aggregate  foreign 
aid  and  national  economic  growth)  and  so 
is largely unhelpful to those seeking specific 
programmatic  solutions.  Given  the  many 
possible  omitted  variables  involved  in  the 
timing  of  foreign  interventions,  related  to 
both domestic and international political fac-
tors, establishing the causal impact of armed 
intervention  on  long-run  political  and  eco-
nomic outcomes has been elusive.
An obvious answer is to call for more data 
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5.  Discussion and Future Directions
Armed  conflict  is  finally  moving  into  the 
research  mainstream  in  development  eco-
nomics.  This  article  has  attempted  to  sur-
vey  this  flourishing  interdisciplinary  field, 
describe its more robust findings, and point 
the  way  forward  in  a  way  that  is  useful  for 
both those new to the field as well as those 
already actively working within it.
Some  of  the  core  insights  are  worth  re-
stating here. First, there has been consider-
able progress in the formal modeling of the 
political  economy  of  civil  war  during  the 
past two decades, with insights on the indi-
vidual  decisions,  institutional  features,  and 






duration  civil  wars,  although  certain  types 
of  information  asymmetries  may  also  play 
a  role.  Disentangling  the  relative  contribu-
tions  of  the  various  commitment  problems 
and  information  asymmetries  proposed  in 
the theoretical literature is a top priority for 
empirical  research.  Developing  new  expla-
nations—possibly  challenging  the  current 
modeling  assumptions  of  unitary  armed 
groups, or even rationality—is also  likely  to 
be fruitful.
Second,  a  variety  of  theoretical  models 
predict  that  low  incomes,  weak  state  insti-
tutions,  and  social  divisions  may  contribute 




ditions—both  low  income  levels  and  slow 




although  the correct  interpretation of  these 
patterns  in  terms  of  underlying  theoretical 




empirical  conflict  literatures have  too often 
run  along  parallel  paths,  informing  each 
other,  yes,  but  seldom  directly  intersecting; 
greater  efforts  need  to  be  made  to  identify 
and test the precise empirical implications of 
the leading theoretical frameworks.
In  contrast,  the  empirical  evidence  that 
social  divisions,  political  grievances,  and 
resource  abundance  are  drivers  of  violence 
remains  weaker  and  more  controversial. 
The  existing  literature  tends  to  measure 
non-material  factors  crudely,  and  empirical 
tests  rarely  attempt  to  capture  the  nuances 
of  a  social  phenomenon  as  complex  as  civil 
war, making it impossible to decisively reject 
that  nonmaterial  factors  are  playing  some 










they  consider. The macro  literature  focuses 
on  physical  capital,  economic  growth,  and 
population,  while  the  micro  literature 
mainly  on  human  capital.  Recall  that  stan-
dard economic growth models, including the 
Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (2003)  framework 
described in section 4, predict that the loss of 
human capital will have more lasting adverse 
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economic  growth  consequences  than  the 
destruction of physical capital. Future work 
must  clarify  how  the  nature  of  the   conflict 
(internal versus international) as well as the 
political,  social,  and  institutional  context 
affects  long-run  economic  growth,  and  just 
as  importantly, must more seriously address 
the many omitted variables that could simul-
taneously  drive  the  outbreak  of  wars  and 
affect postwar economic recovery. The neo-
classical  economic  growth  framework  use-
fully  highlights  the  most  important  gap  in 
our knowledge:  the  impacts of  internal war 
on institutions, technology, social norms and 
culture. Progress on these issues is critical for 
crafting  appropriate  postwar  recovery  poli-
cies,  a  major  economic  policy  issue  in  con-
flict-prone  regions,  including   sub-Saharan 
Africa.
Throughout  this  discussion,  a  key  lesson 
that emerges  is  the  important  role  that new 
data sources have played in enabling research 
progress.  The  development  of  the  PRIO/





ing  number  of  longitudinal  household-level 
datasets  in  less  developed  countries  have 
made the new micro studies on war impacts 
possible.  Some  of  this  data  collection  has 
required  remarkable  ingenuity  and  courage 










coordinated,  publicly  shared  and  compa-
rable, in a similar fashion, say, to the World 
Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study 
(LSMS)  or  the  Demographic  and  Health 
Surveys (DHS) program.61
Data  collection  is  of  course  inherently 
difficult  in  “hot”  conflict  zones.  But  even 
in  many  postconflict  settings  where  condi-




trate  from  the  authors’  own  experiences  in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone,  and Uganda, neither 
the  government  statistical  agencies  nor  the 
international  donors  financing  reconstruc-
tion there had plans to systematically include 
questions  on  war  experiences,  victimiza-
tion, or participation  in  the national census 





data  collection  agencies,  development  orga-
nizations,  and  researchers  will  be  required 
for  the  systematic  and  comparable  data 
needed to make further progress.
A  few  specific  data  collection  directions 
appear  particularly  promising.  First,  more 







establishing  patterns  useful  to  applied  theo-
rists  working  on  rebel  organizations.  While 
the  proliferating  number  of  surveys  of  ex-
combatants  (described  earlier)  will  improve 
such analysis, so far these datasets have been 
selective: most focus on non-state actors and 
61  For  LSMS,  see  http://go.worldbank.org/IPLXWM
CNJ0. For DHS, http://www.measuredhs.com. The insti-
tutional basis  for  such coordination may already exist  in 
the  Households  in  Conflict  Network  (http://www.hicn.
org).









settings  integrating  retrospective  informa-
tion  on  a  wide  range  of  economic  behav-
iors  and  experiences  during  the  war,  along 
the  lines  of  the  data  work  in  Bundervoet, 
Verwimp,  and  Akresh  (2009)  in  Burundi, 
Bellows  and  Miguel  (2006,  2009)  in  Sierra 
Leone,  Blattman  and  Annan  (forthcom-
ing)  in  Uganda,  and  Verwimp  (2005)  in 
Rwanda. The Burundi and Rwanda surveys 
deserve  special  mention.  In  both  cases  the 
authors  identified  a  prewar  national  house-
hold  survey,  located  the  original  (archived) 
surveys, and tracked down the sample house-
holds  again  after  the  war.  Such  intellectual 
entrepreneurship  should  be  expanded  and 
rewarded in the profession.
Third,  we  need  to  improve  measures  of 
political  attitudes  and  grievances  and  test 
their association with actual behaviors. One 
example  stands  out.  James  Habyarimana  et 
al. (2007; forthcoming) identify theoretically 
distinct  mechanisms  that  link  ethnic  diver-




of  300  subjects  from  a  Kampala,  Uganda, 
slum  neighborhood.  Experimental  econom-
ics  lab  research  in  other  developing  coun-
tries,  especially  in  conflict  and  postconflict 
societies, could shed  light on  the  individual 
decision  to  participate  in  violence  or  on 
the  resolution  of  collective  action  problems 
within armed groups.
Fourth,  at  the  macro  level,  we  encour-
age  the  development  and  synthesis  of  data 
on  additional  forms  of  political  instability 
and  violence.  Political  repression  figures 
 prominently in theories of conflict and coop-
eration (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; 




ena  has  been  asserted  rather  than  demon-
strated.  If we are  interested  in  the struggle 
between groups for national power, it is not 
obvious  that  we  should  ignore  coups;  com-
munal violence could similarly shed light on 
participation in violent collective action.62
Civil  wars  and  conflicts  arguably  inflict 
more suffering on humanity  than any other 
social  phenomenon.  Now  they  are  emerg-
ing  as  central  to  many  countries’  political 
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